We've received numerous questions today regarding various interpretations of the latest headlines concerning the Middle East. There’s a lot happening both on the battlefield and behind the scenes, but nothing conclusive or definitive has emerged so far. As a result, it’s difficult to make sense of it all. Overall, none of the information we've reviewed or heard suggests a significant shift in policy or the broader outlook since our last update. Additionally, there are competing views and schools of thought among the involved parties.
For now, airial bombardments continue in Lebanon and Gaza, with the IDF still striking targets in Syria. Hezbollah has intensified its rocket attacks on Israel. IDF troops are advancing further into southern Lebanon, encountering resistance in 22 recorded incidents today, mostly in the form of varying rocket attacks. What's clear is that both sides are underreporting their losses. Meanwhile, suicide attacks inside Israel have increased over the past week.
A strike against Iran’s nuclear and oil production facilities seems to be off the table—as expected. Iran’s official stance remains that any attack on its territory would cross a red line, warranting a swift and more forceful response than what was seen against Israel last Tuesday. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should take their position seriously. It’s also unlikely that Iran will accept any gestures of goodwill from the US after previous episode. Once again, the moderate voices in Iran calling for better relations with the US have been marginalized.
There’s speculation that US officials may have insisted on knowing Israel’s attack plans to offer Iran advance notice. In any case, it seems that those with the power to influence the conflict only act decisively when national interests directly conflict with those of their allies.
The effectiveness of Israel's air defense systems against a barrage of ballistic missiles is not up for debate here. The limited retaliatory options available to Israel suggest a level of effective deterrence, and neither side seems willing or able to escalate to full-scale conflict at this point. Another tit-for-tat exchange between Iran and Israel is unlikely deter either side from perusing their ambitions.
An Iranian counterstrike on Israel is unlikely to target civilians. While there are many unsavory ways to describe the regime in Tehran, it’s generally viewed as a strategic, if not rational, actor. Attacking Israel's desalination plants could be a logical target, but this might also harm Gaza, which relies on Israel for water supplies. If Iran’s long-term goal is to end Zionism, it's likely aiming to make living conditions in Israel untenable, potentially encouraging Israeli dual nationals to emigrate. However, there is no solid evidence yet of a significant, permanent population decline in Israel, and claims of Israeli government censorship of such data are false.
To quote Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group and senior advisor to the President of the United States on Iran: the only thing worse for Iran and the U.S. than the current status quo is a war between them.
For context, The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War by Craig Whitlock provides relevant insights into how conflicts are often misrepresented and misunderstood. The nation-building efforts after the fall of the Taliban were well-intended and sometimes even humorous, but ultimately, they were a total failure.
As far as we can tell, thankfully, since the withdrawal of U.S.-coalition troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, there have been no attacks in the West by Islamist groups. Contrary to the views expressed at the time by many current and former U.S. intelligence officials. Sometimes, the radicals do mean what they say.
Currently, we're on a very bad path. And let's not say it was unavoidable.
