Iran-Israel | Blaise Metreweli | First Female Head of MI6

Ah, we know you’d prefer we press ahead with the Iran–Israel thread. But it can wait. It’s a complex political game of chess—not so much militarily as diplomatically. That’s why we prefer to closely monitor developments on the battleground and rely on (reliable) open-source analysis, where reality is harder to obfuscate than on the newswires. Okay we added a little snippet at the end.

For those too impatient to wait, the ceasefire brokered between Hamas and Israel in 2021 may offer some clues, as we see this as likely heading toward an early conclusion. Specifically, the conditions that led to that truce—let’s face it, it’s unlike the Israelis to stop once they’ve begun, unless one side or the other has achieved its objectives. For once, we might say Iran’s so-called proxies have taught them a thing or two—instead of the other way around.

Speaking of which, the former SIS officer who brokered past ceasefire agreements in the Middle East has shared some of his latest thoughts and analysis with us on the current situation, which we may duly share.

And while we’re on the topic of SIS operatives past, let’s fast forward to the present day…

Blaise Metreweli Revealed as New SIS Chief

Over the weekend, the UK’s top foreign intelligence service (SIS or MI6) announced that Blaise Metreweli would take over from the current chief, Sir Richard Moore, who is retiring. Metreweli’s appointment marks a break from the past—not only as the first woman to head the spy agency, but also because of her age: she’s 47.

The FT published an article detailing her background and bio. On matters related to intelligence and national security, we half-jokingly refer to the FT as the SIS blog.

How Was Our Guess?

Last week, we thought it would be a fun exercise to try and guess the identity of the new SIS chief based purely on open-source information. The real motivation was to gauge the extent to which the details disclosed in the FT article—specifically regarding the identity of the top two candidates—would enhance or hinder our screening of potential candidates Again, this was based exclusive on open source information. And the (binary) gender filter was the only one we considered.

We said:

i) the internal candidate was more likely to get the job; and

ii) a woman whose first initial is “D” was the most likely candidate to show up in our screens—without assigning a confidence level. It simply wasn't possible ex-ante, and likely remains the case ex-post in light of new information. If that makes sense—it’s the difference between in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. Rest assured, a half-decent foreign intelligence agency will have better information—classified or otherwise.

Interestingly enough, when I presented all the exact same information to a good friend who’s an experienced headhunter, he arrived at the same candidate (as us) on his second attempt. It just so happened—by chance—that he knows the other external candidate mentioned in the FT article, and we had an unnecessary debate about the likelihood of her getting the gig. The only things we proved were that availability bias is real, he’s at least a decent headhunter, and he’s not ageist. 😉

Happy to connect if you’re looking to move jobs. He's a top/fun guy I've known for many years.

Here's What We Learned

— On balance, the information disclosed in the original FT article didn’t help improve our shortlist of potential candidates for the next MI6 chief—in fact, it may have even hindered us. Why?

— There was conjecture on my part in assuming the next head of MI6 would very likely need to be a China specialist. The real question was whether the agency would break from historical norms by appointing someone born outside the 1968–1974 range. They did. The former assumption proved blatantly false—shame on me—and may have its own interesting implications for UK foreign policy. The latter, perhaps, signals an even more significant shift within the structure of MI6—beyond gender stereotypes.

— The primary reasons we deemed the internal candidate more likely were:

i) Okay, I’ll admit it—we (or I) were being a bit ageist, based purely on past precedent. While newly retired intelligence officers are still young in absolute terms, the external candidate fell slightly to the left of the typical age bracket. It's an exhausting job—prone to trader burnout.

ii) More importantly, there are many benefits to promoting internal candidates. The fact that career CIA officers can only rise to the level of Deputy or Acting Director seems (to us) a suboptimal constraint.

— Our recruiter friend, who’s less familiar with the defense and security world, did what came naturally to him: he matched the career profile of the external candidate using only the data we provided. We more or less arrived at the same conclusion.

— Needless to say, in both approaches we assumed that a reputable media organization like the FT would not publish any information that could deliberately mislead—at least not in regard to her gender.

— We estimate that around 80–90% of Sir Richard Moore’s cohort of career case officer graduate intakes were male—and the percentage was likely even higher for his predecessor’s generation. In this instance, by disclosing the gender of the future appointee, the FT did not compromise her identity. At least, not to us. They still have some skill—or, whoever ran the analysis on what could or could not be disclosed does.

— Although the data we have on this is limited and flimsy, we’ve found that, historically, women were more likely to leave or opt for early retirement from MI6.

Was She A DEI Appointment?

Yes, yes… the question that may be at the back of some people's mind and a potentially thorny one: Was Blaise Metreweli’s promotion a DEI initiative?

We prefer to have frank and open dialogue, as skirting around issues can often be counterproductive.

The short answer is: only a fool would make a definitive judgment either way based on the scant information available. Besides, Metreweli wasn’t even on our list of potential candidates to begin with. It would be intellectually dishonest for us to say otherwise.

We’ve just demonstrated that relying on conjecture and broad-brushed generalizations is as likely to mislead as to help—especially in the world of espionage, where artful deception is part and parcel of the profession. We were well aware of the limitations of the information we had at our disposal. We won’t go into detail about what that information entailed—not because anything was classified, but out of respect for individuals’ right to privacy. It's even less relevant now.

Here’s what we can say with a higher degree of confidence: if China expertise had been a prerequisite for the role, the next appointee was still statistically more likely to be a woman. In fact, once male candidates were excluded, our list of potential candidates narrowed from three to two. Again, we stress: this was based solely on the (very limited) open-source information available to us.

We were more curious to see whether the FT had inadvertently blown anyone’s cover by revealing too much information.

In short, had our top candidate been selected, we could have said—based on our process—that she was likely the most qualified. And we were (ex-ante) scientific in our approach at reaching our conclusion. That said, we trust those responsible for the appointment to make sound judgments.

Many congratulations to Blaise Metreweli and MI6 on this historic achievement.

Iran-Israel

Argh, here we go. To paraphrase Trump: “The boys are still fighting.” What did you think was going to happen?

Hopefully you heeded our advice and took steps to mitigate risk. We were told the Iranian missiles were all duds and that the their air defenses were all depleted… It appears not to be the case. Surprise.

So who are we supporting here? The genocidal regime or the murderous one? No no—that’s actually a pretty accurate description.

Also, can someone please have a word with Gideon about the title of the article below?

It should read Iran-Israel, not Israel-Iran.

One is the correct answer to the popular pub quiz question: What is the oldest country in the world? And has a population of nearly 90 million?
The other consists of 10 million people (with various residency/citizenship status) and has been around for less than 80 years—still struggling to establish a coherent national identity or define its borders. This, despite all the financial and political support Israel has received over the years from the international community.
Whether by alphabetical order or historical seniority, it should still be Iran–Israel, not the other way around.

Quick responses to the headlines:

“Sure, the regime could collapse—but will the country?”
As of now, there’s no sign of the Basij taking to the streets to suppress anti-regime protests. If anything, one could argue the mullahs have been vindicated in their longstanding claims about Israel and the U.S. To both allies and foes.

For Israel, however, a collapse of the political system would pose a far more existential threat. And it didn’t have to come to this since October 7. Doubling down on a flawed security strategy without a political endgame is doomed to fail. Israel’s enemies have come and gone, but the root of the problem remains unaddressed: the Palestinian question.

“How’s the war may develop?”
Very badly for both sides. The real question is: Which population has greater resilience?

“Was Iran developing a nuclear weapon?”
There was no credible evidence that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon. That has been (and still is) the consistent assessment of every Western intelligence agency for many years—including Israel’s own, the Mossad.

Of course, policymakers don’t always heed intelligence assessments. That can be very frustrating for the analysts. We know from the testimony of Netanyahu’s former national security adviser—and longtime former personal friend—that he doesn’t always follow the law. Nor is he a major consumer of intelligence products, preferring instead the information fed to him by visiting U.S. lawmakers.

Here’s Sima Shine, widely regarded as one of Israel’s most exemplary intelligence analysts, in a rare interview with the Jerusalem Press Club a month ago. Now retired from the Mossad, Shine previously led the Iran desk.

In her concluding remarks starting at (30:15):

“…that will be my last sentence. I think it’s important to mention—many Iranian people are saying: ‘You’re only talking about the nuclear issue. You’re willing to give up on our freedom and our situation just to keep the regime strong for years.’ This is, of course, a huge problem. [Host interrupts: Countless attempts to overthrow—or outvote—the regime have been quashed over the years.] And making a deal with the regime itself sends a signal to the Iranian people.”

Possible translation:

We spent years cultivating sleeper cells and opposition contacts—MEK, Kurds, others—and ended up in a “use it or lose it” scenario. Like Hezbollah’s pager attacks last year. And the threat of blowback or defections became real. Worse still: they could flip on us.

As a side note: the MEK are even worse than the current regime. And the Kurds have, time and again, proven too divided—and often duplicitous—to form the type of opposition needed to establish a state. 

Many groups—especially in that part of the world—claim dreams of statehood, but are unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices or accept the responsibilities of self-governance when it comes down to it.

To Catch A Spy

According to Iranian state media, Mossad operatives inside Iran—allegedly responsible for launching drone attacks and car bombings—are being rounded up. The first summary public execution has reportedly already taken place. Interestingly, they all seem to have been driving the same make and model of white van.

Two common characteristics intelligence agencies look for when targeting recruits are:

i) individuals with split loyalties, and
ii) those with a strong sense of entitlement.

Judging by the personalities involved, that leaves the door wide open for a long list of potential suspects—on all sides. Meanwhile, the purge within the U.S. National Security Council began quietly a couple of weeks ago.

Update 1

The markets still seem to believe that Trump’s tweets—or Truth Social posts—actually matter. As a retired U.S. Ambassador to Russia once said: “If we want to know what the Russians are thinking, we just have to listen to them.” The same principle applies to other so-called adversaries.

Israel has been striking hard across Iran tonight—the reports are accurate. As far as we can tell, there is no formal censorship in place in Iran. In parallel, Israel has tightened its already strict government censorship regime—Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir has authorized the arrest of those posting video footage of the Iranian missile strikes.

All we can say is that both sides have been going hard at one another. But only one side has misled or mismanaged public expectations from the very beginning. The Iranians are starting to probe Israeli air defenses with cruise missiles for the first time—launched from inside Iraq. Textbook.

As we've said before, Trump will have a lot to answer for—endorsing such a high-risk strategy with so many U.S. interests in the region exposed, and military assets spread so far out of position. What were they thinking?!

They knew the details of the Israeli operation—and it’s not going according to plan. And several of Trump's cabinet also expressed concerns at the time. We all know he eventually capitulated to the Houthis—and still!

Unless there are significant consequences for Israel, we don’t see the Iranians backing down here. Or at least, it would come as a surprise to us. There’s a lot happening in the background that most people don’t see.

As for Israel’s nuclear deterrent—the so-called Samson Option—was effectively counterbalanced by the Pakistanis this weekend, as had long been rumored.

As the Russian's say, silly kids playing with matches.

Update 2

This war isn’t going to end with a Trump post in the middle of the night while everyone in Iran is asleep.

Here are a few things to consider:

— Israel has prepared for a two-week war. Iran expects it to last several weeks. This is a war they’ve been preparing for over two decades—originally in anticipation of a U.S. invasion or Israeli strikes on their nuclear facilities.

— As we previously wrote, Iran’s military is decentralized, with regional commands operating semi-autonomously—each with its own war plan designed to sustain conflict for years. All regions reportedly participated in Friday’s attack on Israel once they reestablished control over their air defenses. No doubt it was a brilliantly executed first strike by Israel—and well within the expected script. Apple TV even dramatized the scenario. But as we’ve said since the beginning of the Gaza war: Israel excels tactically, but remains strategically poor.

— What if Israel doesn’t have the level of control it claims over Iranian airspace?

— What if Hezbollah is not the spent force many assume it to be? They performed pretty well in the recent municipal election in Lebanon.

— What if Israel suddenly finds itself facing a new adversary in western Jordan—a group no one had heard of until now, quietly trained and armed over the past two years by Kata’ib Hezbollah?

— What if we said Iran’s military operations would continue even in the event of the assassination of the Supreme Leader?

— What happens after 14 days, if or when Israel runs low on interceptors—and Iran still has plenty of missiles to keep the conveyor belt going?

— What if we told you that Iran has yet to deploy its newest and most powerful ballistic missile arsenal—and that most of the current salvos are decoys, designed as saturation attacks to overwhelm or deplete Israel’s interceptor systems?

— What if we told you that Trump’s animosity toward Netanyahu didn’t begin in late 2020—as is widely reported after Bibi congratulated Biden on his election victory—but much earlier? Specifically, when Netanyahu allegedly pulled out at the last minute from participating in the operation to assassinate Qasem Soleimani in early 2020?

— What if most real experts agree that destroying Iran’s sensitive nuclear sites—buried deep underground—is highly unlikely to succeed, even with a sustained U.S. air campaign?

— What if China has already delivered two cargo shipments of arms to Iran in recent days?

— What if Pakistan has signaled to the U.S. and France that it would retaliate against any nation that uses nuclear weapons against Iran.

— For how long can the Israeli government hide from its own people the fact that entire neighborhoods have been reduced to rubble—like in Gaza? Or arrest those who share images online?

Would any of the above alter the calculus?

Of course the Iranians would signal they’re still open to diplomacy—after all, they’re rational actors, even if despised by the U.S. If they weren’t, the regime wouldn’t have lasted as long as it has. However, any talks would likely take place under the same ethos as the Israel–Hamas negotiations: with missiles still flying, and escalation continuing along the way.

We’d take these mainstream commentators who fill the airwaves more seriously—if even once they’d called a single conflict correctly since, well, forever.