Employment creation potential, labor skills requirements, and skill gaps for young people: A Uganda case study
Introduction
Over the course of the last decade, Uganda’s economic growth has ranked among sub-Saharan Africa’s strongest; indeed, the country’s annualized average growth rate was 5.4 percent between 2010 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020). Despite this impressive growth, there has been limited creation of productive and decent jobs1 to both absorb the burgeoning labor force and improve livelihoods. The population growth rate (recorded at 3.1 percent per year) has consistently remained higher than the jobs creation rate necessary for absorbing persons joining the labor market, resulting in increasing unemployment and pervasive underemployment rates. Moreover, where jobs have been created, few young Ugandans (especially young women) have benefited from such opportunities. Indeed, a study conducted by the EPRC (2018) finds that, while the economy grew by 4.5 percent in 2016/17, this growth was largely driven by the services sector,2 but services, in turn, contribute a mere 15 percent to total employment. In addition, due to severe skill gaps, Ugandan youth are largely engaged in low-value services (e.g., petty trade, food vending, etc.), and only few are able to secure employment in high value-added economic activities like agro-processing, horticulture, or tourism.
Uganda’s economy-wide unemployment rate declined to 9.2 percent in 2016/17 from 11.1 percent in 2012/13. Among youth3 (who represent 21.6 percent of Uganda’s population), unemployment declined to 16.8 percent in 2016/17 from 20.3 percent in 2012/13, however, with less progress recorded for female youth. Underemployment, a critical development challenge faced by the youth, is widespread in Uganda and can partly be explained by low skills among job seekers (at 1 percent), time (at 43.6 percent) as well as wage-related aspects (at 30.2 percent) (UBOS 2018). At the same time, inequality of opportunity is also growing. Even among the employed youth, 21 percent are classified as poor due to the precarious jobs in which they are engaged, especially if they work in the informal sector.
In this regard, informality, underemployment, and unemployment persist in the country’s labor market; as a result, many Ugandans are engaged in “vulnerable employment.”4 Vulnerable employment is often characterized by inadequate earnings, low productivity, and difficult conditions of work that undermine workers’ fundamental rights. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2018), 61 percent of employed persons in the country were classified as engaged in vulnerable employment with the share being higher for female Ugandans (71 percent). Similarly, 68 percent of employed persons living in Uganda’s rural areas are more likely to engage in vulnerable employment compared to 48 percent living in the country’s urban areas.
While agriculture employs nearly 77 percent of the rural population, recorded growth in the sector was low at 2.8 percent in 2016/17 (UBOS 2018). However, sectors providing more productive and better-paying jobs, like agro-processing and high value-added agro-industry have clear linkages to agriculture sector’s overall performance in the country. Weak economic growth in agriculture, therefore, affects agro-industrialization, which, in turn, has implications for the employment viability in the dominant agro-industry. Sector-level performance is also deterred by irregularities and erratic decisions in the business and policy environment. Consequently, the vast majority of Uganda’s labor force remains employed in labor intensive and less productive sectors. Even within agriculture, only a very small proportion of agricultural workers are engaged in the cultivation of high-value, commercialized crops.
The above narrative is also exacerbated by the small and not expanding number of formal jobs, especially in Uganda’s public sector. This lack of available “white collar jobs” is met by a significant number of youth graduating annually either with a certificate, diploma, or degree who aspire to find such employment. While the private sector is coming in to fill the gap in creating jobs for this segment of the population, current efforts are not sufficient, and more opportunities for jobs to be created for this segment of the labor force need to be identified and supported.
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In order to create jobs, especially for the youth, there is need to raise private investment in labor-intensive industries. Besides providing jobs, labor-intensive industries—historically manufacturing— can pave the way for continuous upgrading to higher value-added economic activities. However, the average share of manufacturing in Uganda’s GDP keeps declining, from 11 percent between 2000 and 2010 to 9 percent between 2011 and 2018. Therefore, manufacturing will not be able to absorb the 600,000 young Ugandans entering the jobs market each year (AfDB, 2019).
In light of the slow growth of the manufacturing sector, Uganda needs to find alternatives for the creation of productive jobs if the country is to achieve its Vision 2040. Service-oriented industries that share key firm characteristics with manufacturing firms have the potential to enhance growth and create decent employment opportunities. Such industries are called “industries without smokestacks” (IWOSS). Newfarmer et al. (2018) classify these as agro-industry, horticulture, tourism, business services, transit trade, and some information and communication technology (ICT) based services. This study contributes to the evidence base around this topic by analyzing the role of IWOSS in generating large-scale employment opportunities for (young) workers in Uganda, especially in the formal parts of the economy. The paper pays particular attention to three sectors: agro-processing, horticulture, and tourism, as the earlier literature indicates that these sectors have considerable potential to create large-scale formal employment opportunities for young people.5
Specifically, this study:
Assesses the current employment creation potential along the value chains of IWOSS industries under their respective current sectoral growth trajectories;
Aims to identify the key constraints to growth in IWOSS sectors;
Estimates future labor demand in IWOSS sectors when identified constraints are removed;
Analyzes the occupation and labor skills requirements and gaps in IWOSS sectors; and
Pays particular attention to the need for soft and digital skills among youth (employed and unemployed) to ensure that suggested policy interventions can bridge them.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the approaches adopted as well as data sources and their limitations. Section 3 presents the country context and background with emphasis on the performance of selected IWOSS sectors in Uganda. The section further delves into employment patterns and other salient features of employment in the country. Section 4 analyzes growth patterns in terms of output, productivity, and exports with emphasis on the role of IWOSS in structural transformation. Section 5 analyzes the specific characteristics regarding sectoral employment and comparisons are made between IWOSS and non-IWOSS sectors as well as manufacturing. Section 6 presents the growth constraints that IWOSS sectors face. Section 7 provides projections for the size of labor force by 2029/30 according to skill groups, projections that inform discussion on the skills gaps that need to be filled to solve current employment gaps. Section 8 presents firm-level surveys that provide insights into future employment requirements and the need for digital skills along the IWOSS value chains selected for this study (horticulture, agro-industry, and tourism). Section 9 concludes with policy recommendations to leverage IWOSS sectors for employment generation, especially for youth.
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Addressing America’s crisis of despair and economic recovery
Summary
Despair in American society is a barrier to reviving our labor markets and productivity, jeopardizing our well-being, health, longevity, families, and communities—and even our national security. The COVID-19 pandemic was a fundamental shock, exacerbating an already a growing problem of despair.
This despair in part results from the decline of the white working class. It contributes to our decreasing geographic mobility and has political spillovers, such as the recent increase in far-right radicalization. At the same time, other population groups are also suffering, for different reasons. Over past few years, for instance, suicides increased among minority youth and overdoses increased among Black urban males (starting from a lower level than whites but now exceeding it).
Policy responses have been fragmented, with much focus on interdiction or ex-post treatment rather than on the root causes of despair. There are local efforts to boost the well-being of vulnerable cohorts, but most are isolated silos. There is no federal level entity to provide the vulnerable with financial or logistical support, nor is there a system that can disseminate relevant information to other communities seeking solutions. While federal agencies—such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)—track mortality trends, no system tracks the underlying causes of these deaths. In contrast, many countries, such as the U.K. and New Zealand, track trends in well-being and ill-being as part of their routine national statistics collection and have key leadership positions focused exclusively on these issues.
This policy paper proposes a new federal interagency task force to address our nation’s crisis of despair as a critical first step to sustainable economic recovery. The task force would both monitor trends and coordinate federal and local efforts in this arena. We identify five key areas the task force could monitor and help coordinate: data collection; changing the public narrative; addressing community-wide despair as part of the future of work; private-public sector partnerships; and despair as a national security issue.
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Solidifying the DFC-USAID relationship
Transforming the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) by expanding its resources and authorities while merging it with other financing mechanisms—including the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Development Credit Authority (DCA)—to create the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) understandably required a major sales effort. While the foreign policy elites saw the DFC as a counter to China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative, advocates for international development viewed the DFC as an expansion of U.S. development leadership. And while fiscal conservatives were sold on prospective cost savings through the elimination of duplication, OPIC management told affected staff at USAID (the DCA team that was transferred to the DFC) that all of them would be offered jobs at the new DFC. Meeting all the expectations was always going to prove difficult—but one of the trickiest topics is how to best solidify the DFC-USAID relationship in order to maximize development results.
The DFC and USAID have a long history. In 1971, when OPIC was created, it assumed investment guarantee and promotion functions formerly conducted by USAID. The USAID administrator has always been a member of the OPIC board of directors since its creation, and served as the initial chairman of the board. Over the years, coordination between the two agencies has ebbed and flowed. In 2018, when Congress merged OPIC with several other federal programs and expanded its capital and authorities to create the DFC through the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, a cornerstone philosophy of the legislation was that a vibrant collaboration between USAID and the DFC would be crucial to achieving major development impact.
Eight challenges for collaboration
Mismatch of development sectors. The sectors (or subsectors) on which USAID is focusing at any given time, either as a result of Congressional and executive branch priorities or country-level strategies, may not always be sectors in which the DFC has deep investment expertise and/or in which there is large private sector interest (as expressed via applications submitted to the DFC).
Different approaches and metrics for success. Historically, OPIC has been a demand-driven organization that promptly responded to deals presenting themselves to its Washington-based staff. OPIC measured its success largely on its earnings and the amount of investment it facilitated. USAID, on the other hand, undertakes long-term development projects usually designed by staff in the field, in collaboration with host governments and other local stakeholders and subject to detailed Congressional oversight—resulting in long planning and budgetary timelines. Success of USAID projects has been measured by development outcomes and advancement of U.S. foreign policy goals.
Tension between positive earnings and development effectiveness. The priority placed by the DFC on returning funds to the U.S. Treasury ensures that the DFC often ignores smaller or riskier deals that may only break even, but which can yield significant development results. USAID uses 100 percent of its program funding for grants and contracts that are never repaid, so there is a natural disincentive for DFC staff to work on USAID-sponsored transactions that may only break even or earn negative returns, even though such deals would still be more cost-effective for American taxpayers than a grant or contract.This also means that the DFC “risk analysis models” are much more risk averse than those previously used by the USAID DCA, despite the fact that DCA had a perfectly decent credit history. As a result, DFC deals are more expensive. A DCA $15 million guarantee for a deal in Colombia could be funded with $250,000 (the so-called “subsidy” paid to cover the risks), but now a similar $8 million guarantee for a DFC deal in Columbia requires $340,000.
Misplaced focus on large deals. Some DFC staff currently mistakenly believe that the BUILD Act’s provision stating that the “Maximum contingent liability of the [DFC] outstanding at any one time shall not exceed in the aggregate $60,000,000,000” means that the DFC must reach that ceiling within the seven-year life of the BUILD Act or risk this ceiling being reduced. This is then cited as a reason why the DFC needs to focus on big deals regardless of the scale of development impact.
Different definitions of development success. USAID and DFC view the definition of “major development outcomes” differently. DFC Impact Quotients (IQ) scores can be quite high for projects that USAID might not see as having major development impacts in a sector or country.
Limited political incentives. While heads of U.S. government agencies care deeply about their organizations’ mission, some are also very focused on their agency’s reputation, as well as their personal legacy and reputation. As such, it is a rare DFC CEO or USAID administrator who has the time to spend on helping their colleague get a big “win” if the credit is not shared equally or if the project ranks very low on their own list of priorities.
Limited staff incentives. Currently, DFC-USAID collaboration is not prioritized in the performance evaluations of the staff of either agency. While the performance review systems at USAID vary by hiring type, for those involved in designing and running programs, reviews primarily focus on management and development success of programs. At the DFC, annual performance reviews largely focus on the number and size of deals closed and the performance of deals already on the books. There is little at either agency that would reward staff for collaborating and jointly advancing results, especially factors prioritized by the other agency.
Lack of cross-agency understanding. Significant numbers of staff in both organizations have significant gaps in their understanding of the other organization’s processes, incentives, and strategic orientation, making it difficult for them to understand how the two organizations might best work together and the benefits that can arise from such a collaboration.
Overcoming these challenges requires a sophisticated set of responses. Some can be legislated; others will depend on the commitment of USAID and DFC leadership to facilitate strong collaboration that persists across electoral cycles and changes in administration.
Recommendations
Joint strategy for collaboration. Once every four years (in the year following the presidential election), USAID and DFC should be required to prepare or update a joint strategy for collaboration.1 As part of the strategy, the two organizations should agree on at least three to five sectors of joint interest based on each of their overall sectoral priorities (and funding).2 Similarly, the two organizations should agree on at least five countries of joint interest based on each of their overall country priorities (and funding). The National Security Advisor can facilitate final decisions.
Once the sectors and countries of joint interest are identified, the DFC CEO should ensure sufficient staff expertise within nine months to process any proposed deals in the agreed-upon sectors and coordinate with relevant USAID staff. The USAID administrator should issue an Agency Notice requiring any and all programs in the sectors and countries to identify ways in which working with the DFC could enable achievement of some or all of the programs’ goals prior to using other programming tools. When these modalities of collaboration are identified, USAID should prioritize budget and efforts to support these approaches, and DFC investment papers should reflect that there has been early consultation with USAID and the CDO on each transaction.
Primacy of development. Congress needs to make clear that its number one priority for the DFC is achieving substantial development results. Financial losses on the overall portfolio are to be avoided, but earning a return for American taxpayers has never been mandated in either the OPIC or DFC statutes and should be seen as a nice bonus rather than essential. Positive returns within the portfolio should be used to create a potential fund that DFC could use to take on more risk for greater development impact than OPIC was willing to take on in the past, particularly in low-income countries. Similarly, Congress should clarify that reaching the contingent liability cap within seven years should not be used as a reason to focus on large transactions.
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Joint credit. The two organizations shall be told that on any projects involving joint collaboration, announcements shall be joint and issued by both organizations at the same time. Any public signings of deal agreements, Hill meetings, or public events announcing the collaborative deals shall be designed, undertaken by, and convenient to representatives of both organizations (including, when appropriate, the relevant overseas offices).
Board roles. The BUILD Act’s provision concerning the chairperson of the DFC Board of Directors should be amended to state that in the event of the secretary of state’s absence, the vice chairperson (the USAID administrator), shall chair meetings of the DFC Board. In the event the chairperson and vice chairperson are both absent from a Board meeting, then it shall be chaired by the secretary of state’s designee.
Regular joint engagement. The DFC CEO and USAID administrator should convene a joint meeting of all their senior leaderships annually to brief one another on their organizations’ current priorities, challenges, and collaboration impediments. Furthermore, the current quarterly meetings among DFC and USAID regional leaders should be expanded so that USAID regional and pillar bureaus formally meet with their DFC counterparts and vice presidents once a quarter to review and provide information on current pipelines and programs.
DFC chief development officer (CDO) evaluation. Consistent with the BUILD Act’s requirement that the selection of the CDO shall be acceptable to both DFC CEO and USAID administrator, the CDO’s annual performance evaluation should include inputs received from the administrator, as well as “360° feedback” from personnel in both organizations.
Revised performance factors. For applicable job functions, both organizations should make any modifications to annual performance methods, factors, and metrics needed to recognize and incentivize employees for their efforts to ensure effective collaboration.
Joint training. Personnel within DFC and USAID have been working to create training programs relevant to USAID-DFC collaboration. Training for USAID foreign service officers, program officers, deputy mission directors, mission directors, and any other staff with relevant responsibilities, as well as all DFC investment, origination, credit, and legal personnel, shall include substantive training about the other organization, its tools, and methods of collaboration. Training materials shall be jointly prepared by the two organizations. Finally, the two agencies should broaden and formalize the current minimal two-way exchange of staff for multiyear assignments.
In-country staffing. Either the DFC is going to have to be allowed to have career staff located overseas to conduct proactive business development and work with USAID field staff to integrate DFC’s tools with USAID programs, or USAID is going to have to increase, dedicate, and train overseas staff for that purpose (similar to the “field investment officers” USAID created to maximize the DCA office’s effectiveness).
Beneficiary-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E). USAID and the DFC should jointly fund third parties to independently calculate the number of beneficiaries benefitting from a DFC-USAID collaboration so that those numbers can be aggregated with confidence and credibility.
Paperwork reduction. Congress can help reduce some of the time and staff investment required to enact “subsidy” transfers from USAID to DFC so that deals over $10 million don’t require two congressional notifications for the single transaction.
As the DFC evolves and scales its operations within the mandates set by Congress, policymakers are seeking to work out the kinks and make sure it operates efficiently and effectively. Solutions to fix the budget scoring of equity investments, for example, have been ably proposed by former OPIC CEO Rob Mosbacher and colleagues. Other policymakers are thinking through issues concerning how much to focus on low- versus middle-income countries. We offer these recommendations as another contribution to help the new institution leverage USAID’s development experience and in-country expertise to maximize the development effectiveness of its investments.
Donor engagement with Agenda 2030: How government agencies encompass the Sustainable Development Goals
Overview
In 2015, all members of the United Nations adopted an ambitious agenda known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also known as the Global Goals. The agenda consists of 17 development goals to be achieved by 2030. This report examines how government donor agencies encompass SDGs in international development cooperation, covering 20 of the 30 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It reviews how they propose to incorporate the SDGs at the level of strategy and policy, programs, and reporting of outputs and results. Eighteen of the 20 members (excepting the United States and the European Union) have produced at least one Voluntary National Review (VNR). Although principally aimed at reporting on national progress on the SDGs, some VNRs cover international development cooperation and so are specifically noted. This review is based on how each country presents its engagement with the SDGs and does not assess the extent to which those policies and plans are translated into practice.
All the government donors surveyed here have to varying degrees endorsed the SDGs at the level of policy and strategy, ranging from expression of support at a very general level to embedding the Global Goals in policies and strategies or building strategies around the goals. Some countries address commitments to the SDGs in a comprehensive manner with a single strategy covering both domestic activities and development cooperation, even as a unitary commitment, although distinguishing separate priorities for each. A number of countries follow the SDG pledge to “leave no one behind” and employ some or all of the “5 Ps”—People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnership—that show the integrated nature of the goals.
At the program level, a few donors tie each program, and even budget levels, to the relevant goals but most use the SDGs only as a general reference point. Only a few donors actually report against the SDGs.
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At least five countries have established a central government mechanism for policy coherence on Agenda 2030. In Germany, the Federal Chancellery has the lead on SDG implementation, with responsibility extending across the government and coherence provided through ministry secretaries serving on the State Secretaries’ Committee for Sustainable Development. In Finland, the prime minister’s office coordinates SDG implementation, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is represented on the coordination secretariat. In New Zealand, the Treasury develops a Wellbeing Budget. The Swedish Government has a National Coordinator for the 2030 Agenda,1 and multiple Swedish governmental agencies, including the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), form the DG Forum to work jointly on the global goals. In Australia, a senior officials group co-chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides coordination on the 2030 agenda, both domestically and internationally.
Briefly, the SDG engagement of the 20 DAC members include:
Australia embraces an SDG strategy in its domestic and development cooperation policies that is integrated across government departments. It aligns its foreign assistance budget directly with each of the SDGs. In 2018 it issued a Voluntary National Review (VNR) covering both domestic and development cooperation activities.
Belgium uses Agenda 2030 as an overall framework for its development cooperation. It incorporates the SDGs into certain programmatic areas and maintains a website that allows the user to sort projects by various categories, including the SDGs. Its 2017 VNR includes reporting on its development cooperation activities and provides links not just to SDGs but also to SDG targets.
Canada is noted for having incorporated the SDGs in its Feminist International Assistance Policy. In early 2021 it commenced an exercise in Global Affairs Canada to integrate the SDGs across all of its business functions. Canada used the 2018 VNR to report on both domestic and international activities.
Denmark builds its development cooperation program on the SDGs and links each activity to the relevant SDGs. It sorts partner countries into one of three categories by level of development, each linked to specific SDGs. Denmark requires that the appropriation note for each activity identify the relevant SDGs. Denmark has established an SDG investment fund.
The European Union embraces the SDGs in its development cooperation at the levels of strategy/policy, program, and reporting. It maintains an interactive website that tracks EU work toward achieving each SDG and a website that provides data on EU assistance, including by SDG.
Finland presents its domestic and development cooperation approach to Agenda 2030 in a common strategy. It creates a comprehensive approach in its international development cooperation programs through linking objectives, theory of change, and results reporting to the relevant SDGs.
France has integrated the SDGs in its development strategy and links them to its two principal objectives, 100 percent compliance with the Paris agreement on climate change and to its social link2 interventions. It has issued SDG bonds to finance development activities.
Germany issued a strategy, with several subsequent updates, that explains its approach to each SDG in both domestic and development cooperation policies. For development cooperation, it links priorities and program areas to the relevant SDGs.
Ireland incorporates the SDGs in its domestic and international development cooperation policies and reporting. It has an extensive program for educating the Irish people about development cooperation.
Italy embraces the SDGs in both its domestic and development cooperation policies and reports on both together. It structures its priorities on specific SDGs under the fifth P of Partnership.
Japan comprehensively incorporates the SDGs in its development cooperation strategies/policies, programs, and reporting. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has a video on its website that explains its approach to the SDGs. It has issued social bonds linked to the SDGs.
South Korea places achievement of the SDGs as one of four strategic goals for the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). The mission of KOICA is “Leave no one behind with People-centered Peace and Prosperity.”
The Netherlands integrates the SDGs in its development cooperation strategies/policies, programs, and reporting. Its country development strategies use the SDGs as the narrative. Several websites present the goals, programs, and reporting on its development activities structured on the SDGs.
New Zealand utilizes Agenda 2030 as the overall frame for its development program. It uses the SDGs as the measure of progress for its partner countries in the Pacific, which is the principal focus of its development cooperation program. It explains that it tracks its contribution to the SDGs but that aligning official development assistance (ODA) with SDG outcomes is conceptually and empirically challenging.
Norway sets Agenda 2030 as the overarching frame of its development cooperation program and integrates the SDGs in strategies/policies, programs, and reporting. Its strategy includes communicating with the Norwegian people about the global goals.
Spain uses Agenda 2030 for the frame for its development cooperation. Its 2018 VNR calls for an SDG impact analysis on legislative initiatives to assess their external and global impact on the SDGs.
Sweden sets Agenda 2030 as the overarching frame for its development cooperation program. It publishes strategies on specific development programs and how they incorporate the SDGs, both for geographic regions (e.g., the Middle East and North Africa) and specific program areas (e.g., capacity building). SIDA works with investors and the private sector to advance the SDGs.
Switzerland incorporates the SDGs in its development cooperation strategy. A draft 10-year strategy has completed the phase of public consultation. Switzerland publishes factsheets for priority countries that connect its development activities to the SDGs. Results linked to the SDGs are reported on a website.
The U.K. uses the SDGs as the overall frame for its development cooperation program and incorporates them into partner country profiles. The 2019 VNR reports on progress on each global goal.
The United States has supported Agenda 2030 but has not brought the SDGs into its domestic or international development policies and programs.
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The impact of COVID-19 on industries without smokestacks in Kenya: The case of horticulture, ICT, and tourism sectors
Abstract
COVID-19 has had not only far-reaching implications on the Kenya economy as a whole but also varied short-term and long-term impacts on various sectors. This policy brief provides an early assessment of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the selected industries without smokestacks (IWOSS) that is horticulture, information and communication technologies (ICT), and tourism. Kenya’s economic growth in the pre-COVID-19 period was robust and resilient, expanding by 6.3 percent in 2018 and 5.4 percent in 2019. In the absence of COVID-19, the economy was projected to grow by about 6.2 percent in 2020/21. Following the confirmation of the first case of COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Kenyan economy contracted and the IMF estimated that Kenya grew by -0.1 percent in 2020 relative, to a growth of 5.4 percent in 2019. The service sector was the hardest hit. However, within IWOSS, besides tourism and trade and repairs, all the other IWOSS sectors’ share of employment expanded during the COVID period. ICT sector remained resilient and has demonstrated to be an important enabler for firm operations across sectors—through promoting business continuity amid the pandemic. In Kenya, ICT experienced a one-off shock in the March/April 2020 period and recovered strongly thereafter. Horticulture and agriculture have remained to be relatively resilient even with COVID-19 enabling the Country to remain competitive in the global market.
As part of our recommendations, in horticulture, the country will need to: ameliorate the possible effects of the dynamic non-tariff trade barriers (NTTBs) by supporting continuous skills transfer and extension services to local producers, including small-scale farmers; enhance investments in supportive infrastructure, especially feeder roads and cold chain infrastructure such as “cold” collection centers and pack houses; open up more options for transport—especially maritime transport for exports—by investing in a dedicated maritime line to key export destinations. For the ICT sector, key intervention encompass: fast tracking investment in complementary services such as access to electricity and internet connectivity; supporting development of digital skills partly by scaling up digital innovations in education and skills development sectors; and strengthening the ICT legal and policy framework by fast track an all-encompassing policy for e-commerce. Tourism, which was worst hit in the overall economy, should be revived through enhanced innovations and adoption of emerging technologies along the tourism value chain; quickly adopt and enforce COVID-19 containment protocols; promote and/or incentivize domestic tourism; and put in place social protection programs to cushion employees in the sector.
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Industries without smokestacks in Africa: A Kenya case study
Abstract
This study assesses the scope for industries without smokestacks (IWOSS) to generate large-scale wage employment opportunities in Kenya especially for the youth. IWOSS are non-manufacturing industries that demonstrate high productivity and employment potential similar to manufacturing.
While Kenya has, since independence, prioritized industrialization anchored on manufacturing as an avenue for employment creation and economic growth, the country is facing early deindustrialization characterized by a declining share of manufacturing in employment and gross domestic product (GDP). Recognizing this enormous challenge, recent policy discourse in addressing persistent youth unemployment has widened its focus to include emerging sectors of IWOSS.
This study examined the job creation potential for youth across diverse IWOSS sectors, focusing on horticulture, ICT and tourism, and identified constraints that inhibit growth and job creation. The methods include a review of sectoral performance with respect to growth and wage employment; assessments of current and projected levels of employment and productivity; and application of value-chain approach to examine job creation potential and the key constraints. The main data sources included the Kenya’s Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), the World Bank Jobs Group Database, Occupational Network Data (O-NET), and various survey data sets including the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2015/16 and the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Kenya 2018. These approaches were complemented by a survey of key informants in the three sectors, conducted in 2020. The three IWOSS sectors (horticulture, ICT, and tourism) reveal above-average output growth and are projected to continue being significant sources of wage employment for youth up to the year 2030. In contrast, except for construction, the industrial sectors performed below-average with respect to output growth over the two decades up to 2018.
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The study identified both cross-cutting and sector-specific constraints affecting competitiveness, investments, output, and employment growth of the three select IWOSS sectors. The cross-cutting constraints relate to the investment climate, which encompasses infrastructure, the regulatory environment, and skills. Horticulture faces constraints related to inaccessibility to cold chain facilities, non-tariff trade barriers, limited coordination among exporters, capacity gaps, and insufficient systems for handling food safety compliance. ICT faces additional challenges of weak competition environment and weak supportive framework to identify, fund, and nurture ICT innovations. Tourism faces additional challenges related to multiple taxation and levies.
Recommendations are suggested to address both cross-cutting and IWOSS sector-specific constraints including: Government and other stakeholders should support continuous skills transfer and support to local producers, promote investments in cold chain infrastructure, ensure policy framework that enhances competitive markets to improve affordability, put in place an all-encompassing policy for e-commerce, support private sector investments in education for high-level ICT skills and soft skills, adoption of emerging technologies, enhance development of access roads and promote competitive air transport and promote new product innovations.
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The impact of COVID-19 on industries without smokestacks in South Africa
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has hit several sectors of economies, including those in Africa particularly hard. The affected sectors include industries without smokestacks (IWOSS). The purpose of this brief is to conduct an early assessment of the effect of the pandemic on the economy, and specifically, the IWOSS sectors considered in the country case study, both in terms of the pandemic’s current impact, as well as to present a view on the long-term sectoral impact.
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The impact of COVID-19 on industries without smokestacks in Senegal
Abstract
In Senegal, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant health and economic damage. More specifically, the country’s promising industries without smokestacks (IWOSS) have adversely been impacted, with a dramatic reduction in turnover, investment, and jobs. In addition, the pandemic has significantly reduced fiscal space by both shrinking the government tax base and reducing sovereign debt solvency, and, hence, its international credit ratings. All of these repercussions have contributed to lowering the state’s capacity to undertake investments and implement reforms to boost the IWOSS sectors, and might further result in delaying needed actions to unleash IWOSS potential in Senegal. This brief updates the spring 2021 working paper (Mbaye et al., 2021) on how support to IWOSS in Senegal can create jobs, taking into account the far-reaching effects of the pandemic.
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Putting scaling principles into practice: Resources to expand and sustain impact in education
Deep-rooted, global education challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated—learning inequalities between and within countries, youths dropping out of school, and students in school but not learning—require transforming education systems at large scale to meet all children’s needs. While innovative solutions are being tested in every corner of the world, too many of them remain small. The key question is how to identify, adopt, and adapt what works and bring that to more communities with lasting impact. How can these efforts be effectively, equitably, and sustainably scaled to ensure more children are learning?
In response to these questions, the Millions Learning project at the Center for Universal Education (CUE) launched a series of Real-time Scaling Labs (RTSLs) with local institutions in several countries to generate more evidence and practical guidance for policymakers, practitioners, and funders on how to scale evidence-based education initiatives.
To provide concrete guidance based on key scaling principles and respond to gaps identified through the RTSLs, CUE has developed the following scaling-related tools1 in collaboration with lab partners and other colleagues. Based on empirical research, these resources are designed to foster an iterative, reflective, and data-driven scaling process, with each tool supporting different phases of the scaling journey.
The resources
See also this infographic for an overview of the Millions Learning scaling tools and how they work together.
Scaling Strategy Worksheet: Planning for scale
The Scaling Strategy Worksheet helps implementers, policymakers, and funders articulate a clear, measurable, and timebound scaling goal and high-level strategy.
How to use: This worksheet is intended to support organizations or institutions planning for or in the process of scaling an education initiative. Developing and refining a scaling strategy is an ongoing process that is best done collaboratively and tailored to local context.
When to use: This dynamic planning resource should be used throughout a scaling process, revisited and updated periodically based on new insights, data, and changes in the environment. While it is never too late to use the tool, the earlier the better to start planning for scale.
Download the worksheet in English > > | French > >
Read the accompanying blog > >
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Institutionalization Tracker: Assessing the integration of an education initiative into a system
The Institutionalization Tracker helps implementers, policymakers, and funders measure the progress of integrating an initiative into an education system and identify areas that require additional attention for further integration.
How to use: This tool is designed to track progress toward institutionalization. It is organized by education system building blocks, each of which is broken down into specific elements. For each element, there is a set of criteria to consider when assigning a score ranging from “low institutionalization” to “high institutionalization,” and a column for providing an explanation for the score selected.
When to use: The tool should be used when the vision for scaling includes government adoption or mainstreaming of an initiative into a formal education system. It should ideally be used at regular intervals (approximately every six months) to assess progress and determine actions to strengthen and advance institutionalization efforts.
Download the tracker in English > > | French > >
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Adaptation Tracker: Learning from changes throughout a scaling process
The Adaptation Tracker supports implementers, policymakers, and funders to plan for, document, reflect on, and learn from adaptations made to the model and/or the scaling approach during implementation.
How to use: This tracker should be used in conjunction with a broader scaling strategy to:
Identify key challenges or opportunities as they arise during the scaling process and develop a plan to test adaptations in response.
Implement those adaptations and collect related data.
Document spontaneous or unplanned changes taking place.
Reflect on the results and make decisions accordingly.
When to use: This tool can be used to document and learn from adaptations throughout a scaling process.
Download the tracker in English > > | French > >
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Real-time Scaling Lab Guidelines: Implementing a participatory, adaptive learning approach to scaling
The Real-time Scaling Lab Guidelines help implementers, policymakers, and funders adapt and implement an RTSL process—a participatory, action research approach to collaboratively document, learn from, and support ongoing scaling efforts.
How to use: An RTSL combines ongoing documentation and analysis of the scaling journey with a series of in-person and virtual convenings and workshops that bring together a diverse group of key stakeholders to collectively plan for sustainable scale; discuss and reflect on data, key challenges, and opportunities faced as they arise; and develop and test adaptations and course corrections to scaling strategies through an iterative learning process. The lab offers concrete opportunities for peer learning and exchange, while also generating knowledge on the “how” of scaling impact.
When to use: An RTSL can support and learn from a scaling process in multiple ways and at various points in time, including:
When beginning to plan for scale, launching a scaling process, or entering a new phase of scaling.
When looking to expand and deepen the impact of an effective initiative and create sustainable change within a system, rather than implement a multiyear project and then move on.
When looking to learn more about the scaling process, build capacity for scaling and systems change, and document the “how” of the scaling process—not just the end results.
When the scaling process for an initiative involves multiple stakeholders from diverse sectors, each of whom may have different scaling-related goals or incentives.
Download the guidelines in English > > | French > >
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Infographic: Millions Learning scaling tools overview
This infographic depicts the four scaling tools at a glance and how they complement one another.
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Related Content
City playbook for advancing the SDGs
This “City Playbook for Advancing the SDGs” compiles a series of how-to briefs and case studies on advancing sustainable development and social progress locally. These short, digestible, and practical briefs are written by city government officials for other city officials, based on their direct experience.
This playbook responds to significant appetite expressed by city leaders for capturing and sharing the “how” of innovations and practices to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) locally. These briefs come from cities participating in the Brookings SDG Leadership Cities community of practice and others to elevate innovations or processes with concrete positive outcomes for equity and sustainability. These best practices and tools help disseminate recommendations to a wider range of communities and stakeholders eager to play a pivotal role in achieving the 2030 Agenda.
Co-edited by Anthony F. Pipa and Max Bouchet, these briefs are published in collaboration with the global learning platform for government innovators apolitical.co. We intend to add content to this collection on a rolling basis throughout 2021 and 2022.
If you’re using this playbook to apply an innovation locally or have questions or suggestions, please fill out this short survey.
This playbook is part of the Local Leadership on the Sustainable Development Goals project.