What does success at the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) look like?
Global leaders are gathering in Glasgow in the coming weeks as the United Kingdom hosts the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, known as COP26. As global temperatures continue to rise, the calls for action on addressing the climate change threat rise as well. On this episode of the Brookings Cafeteria podcast, a leading expert on global climate policy and financing for climate action, Amar Bhattacharya, senior fellow in the Center for Sustainable Development at Brookings, shares his perspective on what will make COP26 successful, what sustainable and inclusive approaches to climate mitigation look like, and what gives him hope for the future.
Also on this episode, John McArthur, senior fellow and director of the Center for Sustainable Development, reflects on the Center’s first anniversary, noting significant accomplishments of Center scholars and looking ahead to projects to come, including the “17 Rooms” podcast. Listen to this segment also on SoundCloud.
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Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development, Center for Sustainable Development
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Climate finance meets low-carbon agtech
Headlining the climate finance discussions next week at COP26 may be the shortfall in advanced economies’ $100 billion annual pledge to help low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) adapt and further mitigate climate change. But with actual financing needs quickly approaching the trillions, the more important discussion may be reforming how public climate finance is deployed. Change is needed to mobilize private capital, fill critical gaps, and drive resilient, low-carbon development. Agriculture value chains are a good place to start the conversation.
Solar and other renewables are enabling distributed, low-cost cold storage, irrigation, and processing capabilities that could be transformative for rural communities in Africa and South Asia. Scaling these innovative small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could provide a host of services to help farm households and communities adapt to climate change, including increased income from higher yields and higher-quality produce, reduced risk of crop failure, reduced post-harvest loss, and other resilience gains.
These are real benefits that improve food security and nutritional diversity and help rural communities survive shocks that are becoming more frequent and intense with climate change. Yet of the roughly $600 billion in tracked climate-related financing globally just 0.2 percent goes to small-scale agriculture value chains and financing institutions serving them.
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And while food systems generate one-third of the 52 gigatons in total greenhouse gas emissions globally, it’s not where climate mitigation investments are flowing. The value of carbon markets hit nearly $280 billion last year, but almost none of the SMEs sending diesel generators to the scrap heap are doing it with the help of carbon financing. As Figure 1 illustrates, agriculture-related emissions projects account for 1 percent of all carbon credits issued.
Figure 1. The agriculture sector accounts for just 1% of the global carbon market
Source: AgFunderNetwork, from Berkeley Carbon Trading Project data.
This is despite considerable potential for CO2 reductions from enterprises powering rural agriculture sector transformation. Our forthcoming research finds:
An investment of $200 million to provide solar irrigation pumps to 1.3 million farmers in Kenya would avert emissions of 6.7 million tons of CO2 annually.
Investing $10 million into solar conduction dryers in India would reduce CO2 emissions by 1.6 million tons per year.
Replacing one-quarter of the 8.8 million diesel irrigation pumps in India with solar pumps would reduce CO2 emissions by 11.5 million tons per year.
As Figure 2 puts in context, the global fleet of Tesla vehicles and solar panels displaced a total of 5.0 million metric tons of CO2e in 2020.
Figure 2. Selected low-carbon agtech mitigation potentials, by market
Source: Catalyzing climate finance for low-carbon ag-tech, James E. Rogers Energy Access Project, Duke University.
These are not garden-variety carbon reductions. Like Tesla, they represent the front end of a low-carbon sectoral transformation that could reverberate years into the future. The space is ripe for donors and ESG departments aiming for catalytic impact with their mitigation investments.
The problems—and some solutions
So why are these companies unable to attract climate finance to accelerate scale-up and what’s needed to mobilize agtech investment in LMICs?
1. Pay companies for climate benefits.
Very few companies enjoy financial benefits from the mitigation and adaptation gains they are providing. Accounting and verifying carbon reductions have high transaction costs at the small scale. Measuring adaptation improvements that are highly location specific or involve long time frames are challenging. But in the Data Age, these are opportunities, not roadblocks. Innovative funds and outcome-oriented financing facilities are emerging that build credible metrics to verify adaptation impacts and blend public, philanthropic, and private capital to align risk.
2. Connect SMEs to the climate policy ecosystem, mobilize private investment, and focus on gender.
Billions of dollars for adaptation flow to LMICs through the Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, and other UNFCCC financing entities based on adaptation plans that countries are required to develop. With 80 percent of the food and 40 percent of jobs tied to small-scale agriculture across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the sector is central to these plans. However, none of the SMEs we spoke with were engaged in adaptation planning processes or aware of the content of country plans where they operate. This is because there is little to no role for SMEs in most plans, a troubling gap that UNFCCC funders are realizing.
Targeting support for SMEs under climate plans could also motivate private investment, another area where climate finance is badly underperforming. Of the $30 billion in annual adaptation investment, just 1.6 percent is from private sources. Rather than financing projects directly, public funders must pivot hard to delivering financial products that de-risk private investment—be it through blending, credit enhancement, currency coverage, demonstrating unproven models, or other measures.
Investing with a gender lens might help too. Female-owned SMEs account for roughly a third of formal SMEs in emerging markets, and our sample within agtech was well below that. Women produce an estimated 70 percent of the food in Africa, but women-owned SMEs tend to be far more capital constrained than their male counterparts. Outdated laws and cultural customs often keep female land ownership—and loan collateral—low. To fully leverage the potential of agtech, some investors are moving to non-asset-based lending and other forms of security like future cash flows, purchase order contracts, or accounts receivables.
3. Empower smallholders and address affordability.
Consumers of low-carbon agtech are extremely price sensitive. For SunCulture, a 25 percent reduction in the price of its solar irrigation pump increases the addressable market by 100 percent. Demand-side subsidies or results-based financing—essentially paying an operator for a specific outcome—can be instrumental in bringing scale to a sector and incentivizing expansion into new markets.
We also discovered that SMEs across agriculture value chains face roadblocks, but also offer solutions. Their products routinely offer customers paybacks of 6-24 months, but that makes little difference to customers facing borrowing costs of 30-45 percent annually. Of SMEs interviewed, nearly 60 percent either became consumer finance organizations directly or invested in third-party relationships to solve for a lack of consumer credit access. Improving access to credit—through banks, microfinance institutions, coops, and other nonbank financial institutions—directly benefits farmers and allows SMEs to focus on core competencies
Small agriculture enterprises are addressing the energy access and reliability problems en route to improving the productivity and resilience of rural communities. It’s a snapshot of what low-carbon development could look like. The task before climate investors is to identify these transformative models, demonstrate their benefits and de-risk them, and bring along the private sector to deliver scale.
Climate finance meets low-carbon agtech
Headlining the climate finance discussions next week at COP26 may be the shortfall in advanced economies’ $100 billion annual pledge to help low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) adapt and further mitigate climate change. But with actual financing needs quickly approaching the trillions, the more important discussion may be reforming how public climate finance is deployed. Change is needed to mobilize private capital, fill critical gaps, and drive resilient, low-carbon development. Agriculture value chains are a good place to start the conversation.
Jonathan Phillips
Director, Energy Access Project – Duke University
Victoria Plutshack
Policy Associate, Energy Access Project – Duke University
Rob Fetter
Senior Policy Associate – Energy Access Project, Duke University
Solar and other renewables are enabling distributed, low-cost cold storage, irrigation, and processing capabilities that could be transformative for rural communities in Africa and South Asia. Scaling these innovative small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could provide a host of services to help farm households and communities adapt to climate change, including increased income from higher yields and higher-quality produce, reduced risk of crop failure, reduced post-harvest loss, and other resilience gains.
These are real benefits that improve food security and nutritional diversity and help rural communities survive shocks that are becoming more frequent and intense with climate change. Yet of the roughly $600 billion in tracked climate-related financing globally just 0.2 percent goes to small-scale agriculture value chains and financing institutions serving them.
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And while food systems generate one-third of the 52 gigatons in total greenhouse gas emissions globally, it’s not where climate mitigation investments are flowing. The value of carbon markets hit nearly $280 billion last year, but almost none of the SMEs sending diesel generators to the scrap heap are doing it with the help of carbon financing. As Figure 1 illustrates, agriculture-related emissions projects account for 1 percent of all carbon credits issued.
Figure 1. The agriculture sector accounts for just 1% of the global carbon market
Source: AgFunderNetwork, from Berkeley Carbon Trading Project data.
This is despite considerable potential for CO2 reductions from enterprises powering rural agriculture sector transformation. Our forthcoming research finds:
An investment of $200 million to provide solar irrigation pumps to 1.3 million farmers in Kenya would avert emissions of 6.7 million tons of CO2 annually.
Investing $10 million into solar conduction dryers in India would reduce CO2 emissions by 1.6 million tons per year.
Replacing one-quarter of the 8.8 million diesel irrigation pumps in India with solar pumps would reduce CO2 emissions by 11.5 million tons per year.
As Figure 2 puts in context, the global fleet of Tesla vehicles and solar panels displaced a total of 5.0 million metric tons of CO2e in 2020.
Figure 2. Selected low-carbon agtech mitigation potentials, by market
Source: Catalyzing climate finance for low-carbon ag-tech, James E. Rogers Energy Access Project, Duke University.
These are not garden-variety carbon reductions. Like Tesla, they represent the front end of a low-carbon sectoral transformation that could reverberate years into the future. The space is ripe for donors and ESG departments aiming for catalytic impact with their mitigation investments.
The problems—and some solutions
So why are these companies unable to attract climate finance to accelerate scale-up and what’s needed to mobilize agtech investment in LMICs?
1. Pay companies for climate benefits.
Very few companies enjoy financial benefits from the mitigation and adaptation gains they are providing. Accounting and verifying carbon reductions have high transaction costs at the small scale. Measuring adaptation improvements that are highly location specific or involve long time frames are challenging. But in the Data Age, these are opportunities, not roadblocks. Innovative funds and outcome-oriented financing facilities are emerging that build credible metrics to verify adaptation impacts and blend public, philanthropic, and private capital to align risk.
2. Connect SMEs to the climate policy ecosystem, mobilize private investment, and focus on gender.
Billions of dollars for adaptation flow to LMICs through the Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, and other UNFCCC financing entities based on adaptation plans that countries are required to develop. With 80 percent of the food and 40 percent of jobs tied to small-scale agriculture across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the sector is central to these plans. However, none of the SMEs we spoke with were engaged in adaptation planning processes or aware of the content of country plans where they operate. This is because there is little to no role for SMEs in most plans, a troubling gap that UNFCCC funders are realizing.
Targeting support for SMEs under climate plans could also motivate private investment, another area where climate finance is badly underperforming. Of the $30 billion in annual adaptation investment, just 1.6 percent is from private sources. Rather than financing projects directly, public funders must pivot hard to delivering financial products that de-risk private investment—be it through blending, credit enhancement, currency coverage, demonstrating unproven models, or other measures.
Investing with a gender lens might help too. Female-owned SMEs account for roughly a third of formal SMEs in emerging markets, and our sample within agtech was well below that. Women produce an estimated 70 percent of the food in Africa, but women-owned SMEs tend to be far more capital constrained than their male counterparts. Outdated laws and cultural customs often keep female land ownership—and loan collateral—low. To fully leverage the potential of agtech, some investors are moving to non-asset-based lending and other forms of security like future cash flows, purchase order contracts, or accounts receivables.
3. Empower smallholders and address affordability.
Consumers of low-carbon agtech are extremely price sensitive. For SunCulture, a 25 percent reduction in the price of its solar irrigation pump increases the addressable market by 100 percent. Demand-side subsidies or results-based financing—essentially paying an operator for a specific outcome—can be instrumental in bringing scale to a sector and incentivizing expansion into new markets.
We also discovered that SMEs across agriculture value chains face roadblocks, but also offer solutions. Their products routinely offer customers paybacks of 6-24 months, but that makes little difference to customers facing borrowing costs of 30-45 percent annually. Of SMEs interviewed, nearly 60 percent either became consumer finance organizations directly or invested in third-party relationships to solve for a lack of consumer credit access. Improving access to credit—through banks, microfinance institutions, coops, and other nonbank financial institutions—directly benefits farmers and allows SMEs to focus on core competencies
Small agriculture enterprises are addressing the energy access and reliability problems en route to improving the productivity and resilience of rural communities. It’s a snapshot of what low-carbon development could look like. The task before climate investors is to identify these transformative models, demonstrate their benefits and de-risk them, and bring along the private sector to deliver scale.
Around the halls: Examining the impact of what does (or doesn’t) happen at COP26
The 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26) is scheduled to take place in Glasgow from October 31 to November 12, under the co-presidency of the United Kingdom and Italy. Brookings scholars from around the institution weigh in on how what does (or does not) happen at the conference will impact their area of expertise.
Climate change finance at the macro level
AMAR BHATTACHARYASenior Fellow, Center for Sustainable Development
Earlier this year, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry described COP26 as “our last, best, chance on climate.” Since then, evidence has mounted on the costs of climate change and the urgency of action. Most compellingly, the United Nations’ 2021 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report amasses the scientific evidence on the rapid acceleration of climate change, dramatically narrowing the window for limiting global warming from 2°C to 1.5°C and underscoring the imperative to reach net zero emissions by 2050.
The U.K. COP26 presidency aims to respond to this urgency through four priorities: secure global net zero by mid-century and keep 1.5°C within reach; adapt to protect communities and natural habitats; mobilize finance; and work together to deliver. In each of these four areas there has been a substantial ramp up in ambition. But this progress still falls short of what is needed.
One hundred and thirty countries have committed to net zero, and several — including the G-7 — have set much more ambitious targets for emission reductions by 2030. But many major emitters have not, and the aggregate commitment will fall far short. Many donors have stepped up their climate finance commitments, and a new delivery plan indicates that the $100 billion of climate finance per annum by 2020 commitment will be met no later than 2023. But we now know that around $1 trillion per annum will be needed in developing countries other than China, to accelerate climate investments at the pace needed.
All efforts must be made at COP26 to press for ambitious, concrete deliverables. Inevitably though, much more will need to be done. It will be a success, not a failure, for COP26 to clearly recognize the shortfalls and set a path that can allow us not just to deliver on climate goals but also realize the growth and development opportunities that lie in a low-carbon future.
China’s economic calculations on climate
DAVID DOLLAR (@davidrdollar)Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center
China has put itself in a tough situation heading into the Glasgow conference. It has created problems in its own power sector for reasons not directly related to climate change. It stopped importing coal from Australia because that country called for an independent international effort to find the origins of COVID-19. Strong rebound in China’s economy in the first half of the year then led to a surge in the price of coal. But prices for electricity were kept at arbitrary low levels, so that it was not economically efficient to use coal to generate power. The result has been the worst power shortages in 20 years, and still high prices of coal as China heads into the winter season.
Meanwhile, the world is looking to China — by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases — to lay out bold new measures and targets for carbon reduction. But it is difficult for the government to make concrete commitments as long as its immediate energy crisis continues. With the right policies, Beijing could address both short and long-term issues at once. Most important would be a higher price for power and energy more generally, which would discourage wasteful use and solve the immediate power shortage. China has ambitious plans to increase reliance on solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear to generate power, and to transition its vehicle fleet to electric vehicles. But its plans still rely on coal for a long time. More commitment to energy efficiency and use of gas as a transition fuel would significantly reduce its near-term carbon footprint.
Biodiversity
VANDA FELBAB-BROWN (@VFelbabBrown)Senior Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology and Director, Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors
Coming on the heels of the first part of COP15 to the Convention on Biodiversity, COP26 is an opportunity not only to implement meaningful climate commitments, but also to integrate them with biodiversity conservation. Climate change is one — but only one — manmade cause of critical biodiversity loss. Our current rate of biodiversity loss is the highest since the extinction of dinosaurs, and about one thousand times the historic average. Climate change compounds the extinction of species, yet biodiversity loss also hampers the planet’s natural climate control systems. In other words, the greater the biodiversity loss, the more the planet will heat up. This is merely one example of how many of the planet’s self-sustaining ecological systems are undermined by biodiversity loss.
Yet biodiversity protection has been the poor relation of climate mitigation efforts in international diplomacy. Worse yet, many proposed and even implemented climate mitigation measures ignore biodiversity protection, such as when they predominantly focus on urban areas and do not focus on preserving natural ecosystems like forests.
Some presumed climate mitigation measures even directly contradict biodiversity conservation. Take, for example, subsidized programs for planting trees. If such programs do not also provide funding for the conservation of mature and diverse forests and their biodiversity — and if such payments for conserving ecosystems are not significantly higher than the subsidies for cultivating new trees — local communities or industries frequently tend to fell existing forests (thus undermining or destroying the entire ecosystem) to qualify for subsidies for monocrop plantations. The resulting carbon capture is smaller, and biodiversity is lost.
Security around the Arctic
JEREMY GREENWOODFederal Executive Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
It’s been well-documented that the Arctic is the bellwether for how global warming is impacting our planet. So, it’s no surprise that leaders gathering for the 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference in Glasgow next week have been laser-focused on the Arctic.
Russia is often accused of doubling down on its future in fossil fuel development, much of it from its melting northern coastline that is rich in offshore oil and gas deposits. That same melting ice has opened up a transport corridor that Moscow has unilaterally formed as a maritime “toll road” — known as the “Northern Sea Route” — which has the potential to decrease sailing times from Europe to Asia by 40% compared to traditional Suez Canal routes. Moscow seems to have bet part of its future on these two cash cows, despite the worldwide focus on limiting carbon emissions from fossil fuels and preventing the very ice melt that is opening up this speedy shipping route.
With Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that he will not attend in person, most have consigned the Russian delegation to a spoiler role, for which there is much evidence to support. But it might behoove Moscow to think a few steps ahead, as the melting Arctic may bring more chaos than treasure in the long run. Rampant climate change is likely to bring severe weather to the very offshore rigs that float in treacherous waters, and international law may eventually strip them of the thin veil by which they portend to control the Northern Sea Route. A recent major oil spill in Norilsk demonstrated the risks posed by melting permafrost to even land-based industrial activities. Meanwhile, Article 234 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea only allows coastal states to adopt regulatory measures for passing ships “where…the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation.” It’s only a matter of time until Russia’s northern coastline is not covered by ice most of the year, a planetary climate warning that terrifies most of the COP26 delegates and, if they had a longer vision beyond the increased shipping traffic, should also scare Russia.
The energy transition
SAMANTHA GROSS (@samanthaenergy)Director and Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
COP26 is facing the highest expectations of any climate meeting since Paris in 2015. This marks the five-year point in the Paris Agreement, when countries are expected to renew and deepen their commitment to fighting climate change.
The United States and Europe, along with a varied slate of other countries that together account for most of the world’s emissions, have pledged to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century. Even China and Saudi Arabia are pledging net zero emissions by 2060. But the burning question in my mind going into Glasgow is whether countries are on track to achieve those long-term commitments.
For now, the answer is no. The formal goals at Glasgow are for the near term, through 2030. If countries achieve these goals (Nationally Determined Contributions, in the lingo of the Paris Agreement), emissions in 2030 will be 16% greater than they were in 2010. To be on a path that limits warming to 1.5°C, the level scientist say is necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, we need a 45% reduction in emissions instead.
My hopes for the COP are twofold. First, I hope to see a spirit of cooperation to encourage further action to reduce emissions. The real action here won’t happen at Glasgow, but afterward, when leaders go back to their capitals to establish policy to actually implement their emissions goals. Sharing technology and policy successes among countries could help. Second, I hope to see a renewed commitment from wealthy countries to fund the low-carbon transition in the developing world, along with funding for resilience projects to help these countries adapt to our changing world. Using public funding as leverage to encourage more private investment will be particularly important to achieve a just transition.
Maritime security in Asia
SHUXIAN LUO (@joy_shuxian_luo)Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center
There is a maritime security dimension as to why it is an imperative for leaders gathering in Glasgow to act collaboratively to tackle climate change. Global warming and the resulting rise of sea level is likely to affect Asia’s maritime security landscape in at least three ways.
First, available fish stock may further decline as ocean warming can cause fish populations to be less productive and/or migrate to other regions, aggravating the problem of fish depletion, intensifying fishery-related disputes and conflict, and negatively impacting millions of marine workers in coastal states who rely on fishing for their livelihood.
Second, it can alter the nature of a land feature in a way that raises questions about the maritime zones that the feature is entitled to. For example, a “high-tide elevation” is entitled to the surrounding 12 nautical miles as territorial sea (and an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf as well if it is capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life). But as the sea level rises, the feature may become submerged at high tide and remain above water only at low tide, making it “a low-tide elevation” which is not entitled to a territorial sea if it is located outside an existing territorial sea.
Third, and related to the second point, states might be tempted to protect their land features from being submerged by engaging in more land reclamation activities, which would likely exacerbate maritime environmental degradation and further complicate Asia’s existing maritime territorial disputes.
U.S. economic and financial implications of climate policy
SANJAY PATNAIK (@sanjay_patnaik)Fellow, Economic Studies and Director, Center on Regulation and Markets
One of the most important aspects of climate change is that it is fundamentally an economic issue and a problem of risk management. Therefore, climate change itself, and any climate policies (and the lack thereof) will have significant implications for our economic and financial system. As the rest of the world and especially the EU move quickly to facilitate a transition towards a low-carbon economy, it will become even more important for the United States to follow the same path. Policy measures like a price on carbon, mandatory climate risk disclosures for publicly traded companies, and climate stress testing in the financial system are being implemented in countries around the world. These policies are critical to prepare countries for a low-carbon future, and are also significantly shaping global markets.
Without implementing a policy plan at home that can credibly lead to the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions needed to reach the Biden’s administration’s stated goals by 2030, the U.S. will have a difficult standing in Glasgow. Importantly, without credible climate policies, U.S. firms’ ability to remain competitive when operating in global markets will be impeded and the potential for the U.S. to become a leader in new, low-carbon technologies and industries will be reduced. It is therefore more critical than ever that the Biden administration and Congress implement a wide range of carrot and stick policies that address climate change and bring us in line with other developed nations. This will also strengthen our negotiating position at COP26.
Climate as a threat multiplier in the Middle East
NATAN SACHS (@natansachs)Director and Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy
COP26 is an instance of the gaping disconnect between Middle Eastern stakes in climate change and the marginal role Middle Eastern countries assume in combating it and adapting to it. The region is already one of the worst affected by climate change, and the potential for future damage is huge. The Nile Delta for example, with dozens of millions of people, is at direct risk of rising sea levels, with the city of Alexandria facing potential inundation. Water insecurity throughout the region could worsen dramatically, necessitating costly and energy-intensive desalination, and fueling political crises in and between states. Millions could find themselves living in areas where working outside during the day becomes impossible due to heat. And many millions will likely find themselves seeking refuge in new places, exacerbating the already-acute refugee crises in and around the Middle East.
The challenges are truly immense. Yet in many countries, the political structures are incapable or unwilling to meet them, busying themselves instead with geopolitical, ideological, and especially domestic rivalries. There are a few exceptions where capacity or resources allow for efforts to combat climate change on a serious scale, including the Gulf States and Israel. But the wealthiest countries in the Gulf, who could finance regional efforts, are also the major producers of fossil fuels, creating a conflict of interest on mitigation. So far, they’ve also exhibited vastly insufficient efforts on adaptation, as they prepare for a potential change in energy markets away from the oil and gas that provide their wealth and sustain their political model. As a result, most Middle East countries will not feature prominently at COP26 — a telling sign of historic political failure.
U.S. as a global leader on climate
TODD STERN (@tsterndc)Nonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
The central measure of success for COP26 in Glasgow will be whether countries have ramped up their Paris emission targets enough in 2021 to “keep 1.5 alive.” This COP coincides with the first of the five-year cycles for countries to ratchet up their targets. And it is all the more important because the broad consensus of climate opinion has shifted since Paris from embracing a below 2°C temperature goal to embracing a limit on temperature increase of 1.5°C. This is an enormously challenging target, thought to require net zero global emissions by 2050 and a roughly 50% global emissions cut within this decade.
There has been some striking progress this year. The U.S., EU, and U.K., among a number of others, have announced 2030 emission reductions at the right scale. But other big players have not cranked up their Paris targets consistent with a 1.5°C effort, and the biggest and most important is China, responsible for 27% of global CO2 emissions — more than all developed countries put together. A strong move by China would also encourage other big emitters to follow their lead. However, if, as is likely, China does not make a serious move in Glasgow, it will be vital that the COP outcome send a clear message that 1.5 must still be kept alive and that countries who have not yet met their climate responsibility will be expected to do so in 2022. Failing to act in Glasgow should get no one off the hook.
India, net-zero, and equity
RAHUL TONGIA (@DrTongia)Nonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
There is immense pressure on India to announce a carbon net-zero pledge at COP26. With emissions under half the world average, it would be rational for Delhi to avoid doing so just yet. India could announce a later date than China, which pledged net-zero by 2060. Or it could make sectoral plans, such as the aim to more than quadruple renewables in 10 years, or even to peak use of coal in the power sector. However, some plans could be conditional on global support, especially finance.
India, with others, will argue that we cannot entirely ignore equity issues. This is likely to come up in contentious issues like Article 6, which will set the rules for markets, transfers, and offsets. A number of countries are banding together for negotiations. The Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), including China, India, and a few dozen others, have the clout of representing some half the world’s population, but it’s also questionable to speak of Saudi Arabia or China, who are not “low-emitters,” in the same vein as Mali or even India.
Once again, India risks being pegged, unfairly, as possible spoilsport. Delhi will have to walk a tightrope to show its actions, with or without a net-zero pledge, are globally leading but also don’t cap inevitable growth in emissions in the coming years. More meaningful than a grand ambition decades out is what India (or anyone else) does in the short and medium term. Watch for that.
Innovation and decarbonization
DAVID G. VICTORNonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
Diplomacy will be in the spotlight at COP26 — along with a lot of posturing about which countries are making big enough efforts to cut emissions. But diplomacy, for the most part, is overrated. At best, it sets a general direction for cutting emissions. When the diplomats reach consensus, as they usually do, they make legitimate the efforts to push governments and firms to make deeper cuts in emissions.
But what really matters is innovation that disrupts old industries. As new technologies get cheaper they also rewrite the politics of decarbonization — making it easier to build and hold together the political coalitions for supporting policies.
COP26, while formally a diplomatic event, will also be a watering hole for the firms and governments that are doing the most to back innovation. Leaders from industries on the front lines — such as oil and gas, electricity, and transportation — will show up, keen to show serious plans that take decarbonization seriously. The bankers will be there too, for capital is already shifting into decarbonization.
A technological perspective helps explain why most people overestimate how quickly the world economy will decarbonize in the short term — disruptive change is slow to take hold, and the incumbents don’t leave quietly — but underestimate just how transformative all the changes will be over the long haul. And when you look at entry of new low-carbon technologies you see quite a lot of hope. This hope comes from working on decarbonization sector by sector, not pretending that a global diplomatic committee will do the job.
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Around the halls: Examining the impact of what does (or doesn’t) happen at COP26
The 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26) is scheduled to take place in Glasgow from October 31 to November 12, under the co-presidency of the United Kingdom and Italy. Brookings scholars from around the institution weigh in on how what does (or does not) happen at the conference will impact their area of expertise.
Climate change finance at the macro level
AMAR BHATTACHARYA
Senior Fellow, Center for Sustainable Development
Earlier this year, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry described COP26 as “our last, best, chance on climate.” Since then, evidence has mounted on the costs of climate change and the urgency of action. Most compellingly, the United Nations’ 2021 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report amasses the scientific evidence on the rapid acceleration of climate change, dramatically narrowing the window for limiting global warming from 2°C to 1.5°C and underscoring the imperative to reach net zero emissions by 2050.
Amar Bhattacharya
Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development, Center for Sustainable Development
David Dollar
Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, John L. Thornton China Center
Twitter
davidrdollar
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors
Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative
Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Twitter
VFelbabBrown
Jeremy Greenwood
Federal Executive Fellow – The Brookings Institution
Samantha Gross
Director – Energy Security and Climate Initiative
Fellow – Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
Twitter
samanthaenergy
Shuxian Luo
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow – Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center
Twitter
joy_shuxian_luo
Sanjay Patnaik
Director – Center on Regulation and Markets
Bernard L. Schwartz Chair in Economic Policy Development
Fellow – Economic Studies
Twitter
sanjay_patnaik
Natan Sachs
Director – Center for Middle East Policy
Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Twitter
natansachs
Todd Stern
Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
Twitter
tsterndc
Rahul Tongia
Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
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@DrTongia
David G. Victor
Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
The U.K. COP26 presidency aims to respond to this urgency through four priorities: secure global net zero by mid-century and keep 1.5°C within reach; adapt to protect communities and natural habitats; mobilize finance; and work together to deliver. In each of these four areas there has been a substantial ramp up in ambition. But this progress still falls short of what is needed.
One hundred and thirty countries have committed to net zero, and several — including the G-7 — have set much more ambitious targets for emission reductions by 2030. But many major emitters have not, and the aggregate commitment will fall far short. Many donors have stepped up their climate finance commitments, and a new delivery plan indicates that the $100 billion of climate finance per annum by 2020 commitment will be met no later than 2023. But we now know that around $1 trillion per annum will be needed in developing countries other than China, to accelerate climate investments at the pace needed.
All efforts must be made at COP26 to press for ambitious, concrete deliverables. Inevitably though, much more will need to be done. It will be a success, not a failure, for COP26 to clearly recognize the shortfalls and set a path that can allow us not just to deliver on climate goals but also realize the growth and development opportunities that lie in a low-carbon future.
China’s economic calculations on climate
DAVID DOLLAR (@davidrdollar)
Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center
China has put itself in a tough situation heading into the Glasgow conference. It has created problems in its own power sector for reasons not directly related to climate change. It stopped importing coal from Australia because that country called for an independent international effort to find the origins of COVID-19. Strong rebound in China’s economy in the first half of the year then led to a surge in the price of coal. But prices for electricity were kept at arbitrary low levels, so that it was not economically efficient to use coal to generate power. The result has been the worst power shortages in 20 years, and still high prices of coal as China heads into the winter season.
Meanwhile, the world is looking to China — by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases — to lay out bold new measures and targets for carbon reduction. But it is difficult for the government to make concrete commitments as long as its immediate energy crisis continues. With the right policies, Beijing could address both short and long-term issues at once. Most important would be a higher price for power and energy more generally, which would discourage wasteful use and solve the immediate power shortage. China has ambitious plans to increase reliance on solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear to generate power, and to transition its vehicle fleet to electric vehicles. But its plans still rely on coal for a long time. More commitment to energy efficiency and use of gas as a transition fuel would significantly reduce its near-term carbon footprint.
Biodiversity
VANDA FELBAB-BROWN (@VFelbabBrown)
Senior Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology and Director, Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors
Coming on the heels of the first part of COP15 to the Convention on Biodiversity, COP26 is an opportunity not only to implement meaningful climate commitments, but also to integrate them with biodiversity conservation. Climate change is one — but only one — manmade cause of critical biodiversity loss. Our current rate of biodiversity loss is the highest since the extinction of dinosaurs, and about one thousand times the historic average. Climate change compounds the extinction of species, yet biodiversity loss also hampers the planet’s natural climate control systems. In other words, the greater the biodiversity loss, the more the planet will heat up. This is merely one example of how many of the planet’s self-sustaining ecological systems are undermined by biodiversity loss.
Yet biodiversity protection has been the poor relation of climate mitigation efforts in international diplomacy. Worse yet, many proposed and even implemented climate mitigation measures ignore biodiversity protection, such as when they predominantly focus on urban areas and do not focus on preserving natural ecosystems like forests.
Some presumed climate mitigation measures even directly contradict biodiversity conservation. Take, for example, subsidized programs for planting trees. If such programs do not also provide funding for the conservation of mature and diverse forests and their biodiversity — and if such payments for conserving ecosystems are not significantly higher than the subsidies for cultivating new trees — local communities or industries frequently tend to fell existing forests (thus undermining or destroying the entire ecosystem) to qualify for subsidies for monocrop plantations. The resulting carbon capture is smaller, and biodiversity is lost.
Security around the Arctic
JEREMY GREENWOOD
Federal Executive Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
It’s been well-documented that the Arctic is the bellwether for how global warming is impacting our planet. So, it’s no surprise that leaders gathering for the 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference in Glasgow next week have been laser-focused on the Arctic.
Russia is often accused of doubling down on its future in fossil fuel development, much of it from its melting northern coastline that is rich in offshore oil and gas deposits. That same melting ice has opened up a transport corridor that Moscow has unilaterally formed as a maritime “toll road” — known as the “Northern Sea Route” — which has the potential to decrease sailing times from Europe to Asia by 40% compared to traditional Suez Canal routes. Moscow seems to have bet part of its future on these two cash cows, despite the worldwide focus on limiting carbon emissions from fossil fuels and preventing the very ice melt that is opening up this speedy shipping route.
With Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that he will not attend in person, most have consigned the Russian delegation to a spoiler role, for which there is much evidence to support. But it might behoove Moscow to think a few steps ahead, as the melting Arctic may bring more chaos than treasure in the long run. Rampant climate change is likely to bring severe weather to the very offshore rigs that float in treacherous waters, and international law may eventually strip them of the thin veil by which they portend to control the Northern Sea Route. A recent major oil spill in Norilsk demonstrated the risks posed by melting permafrost to even land-based industrial activities. Meanwhile, Article 234 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea only allows coastal states to adopt regulatory measures for passing ships “where…the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation.” It’s only a matter of time until Russia’s northern coastline is not covered by ice most of the year, a planetary climate warning that terrifies most of the COP26 delegates and, if they had a longer vision beyond the increased shipping traffic, should also scare Russia.
The energy transition
SAMANTHA GROSS (@samanthaenergy)
Director and Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
COP26 is facing the highest expectations of any climate meeting since Paris in 2015. This marks the five-year point in the Paris Agreement, when countries are expected to renew and deepen their commitment to fighting climate change.
The United States and Europe, along with a varied slate of other countries that together account for most of the world’s emissions, have pledged to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century. Even China and Saudi Arabia are pledging net zero emissions by 2060. But the burning question in my mind going into Glasgow is whether countries are on track to achieve those long-term commitments.
For now, the answer is no. The formal goals at Glasgow are for the near term, through 2030. If countries achieve these goals (Nationally Determined Contributions, in the lingo of the Paris Agreement), emissions in 2030 will be 16% greater than they were in 2010. To be on a path that limits warming to 1.5°C, the level scientist say is necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, we need a 45% reduction in emissions instead.
My hopes for the COP are twofold. First, I hope to see a spirit of cooperation to encourage further action to reduce emissions. The real action here won’t happen at Glasgow, but afterward, when leaders go back to their capitals to establish policy to actually implement their emissions goals. Sharing technology and policy successes among countries could help. Second, I hope to see a renewed commitment from wealthy countries to fund the low-carbon transition in the developing world, along with funding for resilience projects to help these countries adapt to our changing world. Using public funding as leverage to encourage more private investment will be particularly important to achieve a just transition.
Maritime security in Asia
SHUXIAN LUO (@joy_shuxian_luo)
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center
There is a maritime security dimension as to why it is an imperative for leaders gathering in Glasgow to act collaboratively to tackle climate change. Global warming and the resulting rise of sea level is likely to affect Asia’s maritime security landscape in at least three ways.
First, available fish stock may further decline as ocean warming can cause fish populations to be less productive and/or migrate to other regions, aggravating the problem of fish depletion, intensifying fishery-related disputes and conflict, and negatively impacting millions of marine workers in coastal states who rely on fishing for their livelihood.
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Second, it can alter the nature of a land feature in a way that raises questions about the maritime zones that the feature is entitled to. For example, a “high-tide elevation” is entitled to the surrounding 12 nautical miles as territorial sea (and an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf as well if it is capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life). But as the sea level rises, the feature may become submerged at high tide and remain above water only at low tide, making it “a low-tide elevation” which is not entitled to a territorial sea if it is located outside an existing territorial sea.
Third, and related to the second point, states might be tempted to protect their land features from being submerged by engaging in more land reclamation activities, which would likely exacerbate maritime environmental degradation and further complicate Asia’s existing maritime territorial disputes.
U.S. economic and financial implications of climate policy
SANJAY PATNAIK (@sanjay_patnaik)
Fellow, Economic Studies and Director, Center on Regulation and Markets
One of the most important aspects of climate change is that it is fundamentally an economic issue and a problem of risk management. Therefore, climate change itself, and any climate policies (and the lack thereof) will have significant implications for our economic and financial system. As the rest of the world and especially the EU move quickly to facilitate a transition towards a low-carbon economy, it will become even more important for the United States to follow the same path. Policy measures like a price on carbon, mandatory climate risk disclosures for publicly traded companies, and climate stress testing in the financial system are being implemented in countries around the world. These policies are critical to prepare countries for a low-carbon future, and are also significantly shaping global markets.
Without implementing a policy plan at home that can credibly lead to the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions needed to reach the Biden’s administration’s stated goals by 2030, the U.S. will have a difficult standing in Glasgow. Importantly, without credible climate policies, U.S. firms’ ability to remain competitive when operating in global markets will be impeded and the potential for the U.S. to become a leader in new, low-carbon technologies and industries will be reduced. It is therefore more critical than ever that the Biden administration and Congress implement a wide range of carrot and stick policies that address climate change and bring us in line with other developed nations. This will also strengthen our negotiating position at COP26.
Climate as a threat multiplier in the Middle East
NATAN SACHS (@natansachs)
Director and Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy
COP26 is an instance of the gaping disconnect between Middle Eastern stakes in climate change and the marginal role Middle Eastern countries assume in combating it and adapting to it. The region is already one of the worst affected by climate change, and the potential for future damage is huge. The Nile Delta for example, with dozens of millions of people, is at direct risk of rising sea levels, with the city of Alexandria facing potential inundation. Water insecurity throughout the region could worsen dramatically, necessitating costly and energy-intensive desalination, and fueling political crises in and between states. Millions could find themselves living in areas where working outside during the day becomes impossible due to heat. And many millions will likely find themselves seeking refuge in new places, exacerbating the already-acute refugee crises in and around the Middle East.
The challenges are truly immense. Yet in many countries, the political structures are incapable or unwilling to meet them, busying themselves instead with geopolitical, ideological, and especially domestic rivalries. There are a few exceptions where capacity or resources allow for efforts to combat climate change on a serious scale, including the Gulf States and Israel. But the wealthiest countries in the Gulf, who could finance regional efforts, are also the major producers of fossil fuels, creating a conflict of interest on mitigation. So far, they’ve also exhibited vastly insufficient efforts on adaptation, as they prepare for a potential change in energy markets away from the oil and gas that provide their wealth and sustain their political model. As a result, most Middle East countries will not feature prominently at COP26 — a telling sign of historic political failure.
U.S. as a global leader on climate
TODD STERN (@tsterndc)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
The central measure of success for COP26 in Glasgow will be whether countries have ramped up their Paris emission targets enough in 2021 to “keep 1.5 alive.” This COP coincides with the first of the five-year cycles for countries to ratchet up their targets. And it is all the more important because the broad consensus of climate opinion has shifted since Paris from embracing a below 2°C temperature goal to embracing a limit on temperature increase of 1.5°C. This is an enormously challenging target, thought to require net zero global emissions by 2050 and a roughly 50% global emissions cut within this decade.
There has been some striking progress this year. The U.S., EU, and U.K., among a number of others, have announced 2030 emission reductions at the right scale. But other big players have not cranked up their Paris targets consistent with a 1.5°C effort, and the biggest and most important is China, responsible for 27% of global CO2 emissions — more than all developed countries put together. A strong move by China would also encourage other big emitters to follow their lead. However, if, as is likely, China does not make a serious move in Glasgow, it will be vital that the COP outcome send a clear message that 1.5 must still be kept alive and that countries who have not yet met their climate responsibility will be expected to do so in 2022. Failing to act in Glasgow should get no one off the hook.
India, net-zero, and equity
RAHUL TONGIA (@DrTongia)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
There is immense pressure on India to announce a carbon net-zero pledge at COP26. With emissions under half the world average, it would be rational for Delhi to avoid doing so just yet. India could announce a later date than China, which pledged net-zero by 2060. Or it could make sectoral plans, such as the aim to more than quadruple renewables in 10 years, or even to peak use of coal in the power sector. However, some plans could be conditional on global support, especially finance.
India, with others, will argue that we cannot entirely ignore equity issues. This is likely to come up in contentious issues like Article 6, which will set the rules for markets, transfers, and offsets. A number of countries are banding together for negotiations. The Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), including China, India, and a few dozen others, have the clout of representing some half the world’s population, but it’s also questionable to speak of Saudi Arabia or China, who are not “low-emitters,” in the same vein as Mali or even India.
Once again, India risks being pegged, unfairly, as possible spoilsport. Delhi will have to walk a tightrope to show its actions, with or without a net-zero pledge, are globally leading but also don’t cap inevitable growth in emissions in the coming years. More meaningful than a grand ambition decades out is what India (or anyone else) does in the short and medium term. Watch for that.
Innovation and decarbonization
DAVID G. VICTOR
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
Diplomacy will be in the spotlight at COP26 — along with a lot of posturing about which countries are making big enough efforts to cut emissions. But diplomacy, for the most part, is overrated. At best, it sets a general direction for cutting emissions. When the diplomats reach consensus, as they usually do, they make legitimate the efforts to push governments and firms to make deeper cuts in emissions.
But what really matters is innovation that disrupts old industries. As new technologies get cheaper they also rewrite the politics of decarbonization — making it easier to build and hold together the political coalitions for supporting policies.
COP26, while formally a diplomatic event, will also be a watering hole for the firms and governments that are doing the most to back innovation. Leaders from industries on the front lines — such as oil and gas, electricity, and transportation — will show up, keen to show serious plans that take decarbonization seriously. The bankers will be there too, for capital is already shifting into decarbonization.
A technological perspective helps explain why most people overestimate how quickly the world economy will decarbonize in the short term — disruptive change is slow to take hold, and the incumbents don’t leave quietly — but underestimate just how transformative all the changes will be over the long haul. And when you look at entry of new low-carbon technologies you see quite a lot of hope. This hope comes from working on decarbonization sector by sector, not pretending that a global diplomatic committee will do the job.
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South Africa’s municipal elections: A referendum on political parties and local democracy
On November 1, South Africans will go to the polls in the sixth round of local government elections since the country’s democratic transition in 1994. Voters will be able to choose among 60,000 candidates and more than 300 political parties to elect councilors for 257 municipalities.
Typically, local elections in sub-Saharan Africa rarely receive much attention. South Africa, however is an exception: Not only is it the region’s most decentralized country, so that local governments have substantive autonomy over services citizens care about, but it’s also a place where local elections are seen as a bellwether for party performance in the general elections. Notably, this electoral contest will be the first since the deadly riots that rocked the country back in July when supporters of the former president, Jacob Zuma, rebelled against his conviction for contempt of court when he failed to attend a corruption inquiry. In addition, with more than 60 percent of South Africa’s population classified as urban, control of the country’s eight large metropolitan areas (known as metros) provides both political leverage and economic clout.
How do the elections work?
South Africa operates a mixed member electoral system for municipal elections, meaning that half the seats on the councils are chosen through proportional representation—whereby the parties receive seats in proportion to the share of votes they receive—and half are chosen through a single-member constituency-based system so that individual candidates who receive the most votes in their ward gain their ward’s seat. In the metros, voters receive two ballots: one for a party and one for a ward councilor. In smaller cities and rural areas, voters also receive a third ballot to choose a party for a district municipality, which encompasses about four to six local municipalities and coordinates cross-boundary development issues. According to the Municipal Structures Act, the newly elected council then chooses an executive committee among their members, which in turn selects the mayor and deputy for the municipality. Compared to a system of direct elections for mayor by voters, this approach encourages more upward accountability to the party, causing the local elections to strongly reflect parties’ organizational capabilities and coherence.
Importance of the 2021 elections to South Africa’s political parties
In the 2016 elections, the African National Congress (ANC)—the leading political party since the end of apartheid in 1994—experienced massive local election losses for the first time ever. Some of the countries’ largest economic centers, including Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay, went to the opposition because the ANC could not obtain outright majorities and had to enter coalitions with other parties. Much of this shift could be attributed to the low popularity of then-President Jacob Zuma in the aftermath of the “State Capture” controversy and the “Fees Must Fall” protests across universities, as well as to the growing attraction of both the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the leadership at that time of Mmusi Maimane and the surprising endurance of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) under the populist Julius Malema. For the 2021 elections, a poll by the public opinion company Ipsos showed that 49 percent of respondents intend to support the ANC on November 1, falling from the 53.9 percent the party obtained in the 2016 contest. This number is still massively higher than the DA and EFF—which respondents claim to support at 17.9 and 14.5 percent, respectively—but depending on the distribution of those votes and seat allocations, could leave the ANC again scrambling to gain majorities in the coveted metros.
Will this contest largely amount to a referendum on the ruling ANC and more importantly, for Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency? The ruling party has intense competing factions, including a divide between pro-Zuma loyalists who could be implicated for corruption, and pro-Ramaphosa supporters who believe internal party reform is critical for regaining citizen support. Already, such rivalries have affected the ability of the ANC to agree on candidates to represent the party across more than 90 wards. More worryingly, they’ve contributed to large-scale political violence and several killings, mostly concentrated in Zuma’s stronghold of Kwa-Zulu Natal province.
The anti-Ramaphosa faction may be hoping that a poor showing will hurt the sitting president and allow others in the party to justify competing against him in the party’s national conference next December. His deputy vice president, David Mabuza, already has announced his intentions to compete against Ramaphosa at that conference. However, control of municipal councils provides the ANC with a huge source of patronage—particularly via access to municipal jobs for local-level party branch members. Therefore, if rivalries among party elites cost the ANC control of major councils, especially the metros, it could affect the party’s ability to retain support among the rank and file in the 2024 general elections.
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The electoral outcome will be equally consequential for the other two main opposition parties, the DA and EFF. The DA recently has faced a series of defections, including in 2019 by Maimane who created the Movement for One South Africa, and Herman Mashaba, the former mayor of Johannesburg, who established the Action South Africa party. Now under the leadership of John Steenhuisen, the party may not be able to break perceptions that it is mostly representative of white privilege and may not gain much ground beyond its traditional stronghold of Cape Town and the Western Province.
The EFF, which took away black votes from the ANC in 2016, could pose a bigger threat for the ruling party in Limpopo—Malema’s home province—and in Gauteng and Northwest. Reports indicate the EFF has gained much more financing for advertisements and handouts than were available in the previous local contest. However, the party’s growing popularity creates a challenge: Unlikely to win outright majorities in most councils, the EFF’s path to governing will rely on entering coalitions with one of the other two big parties. On the one hand, the party’s left-wing, nationalist platform contrasts sharply with the pro-market position of the DA. In fact, DA-EFF coalitions established after the 2016 elections ultimately crumbled in several councils because the two parties operate at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. By the same token, Malema, who relishes attacking the ANC with his combative rhetoric and populist style, would be wary that a compromise with the ANC would alienate EFF supporters. On the other hand, without more substantive experience governing at the local level through such coalitions, it will be difficult for the EFF to gain widespread voter confidence in national elections.
Reinvigorating faith in local government
Perhaps more substantively than foreshadowing political parties’ electoral fortunes in 2024, the elections on November 1 are critical to strengthening local democracy and serve as a mechanism to encourage municipal governments to improve their performance. Based on recently released data from Afrobarometer that was collected in May-June of this year, close to 45 percent of South Africans claim they do “not at all” trust their local government council, and more than 60 percent disapprove or strongly disapprove of the performance of their elected local government councilor. Trust has declined over the last six years while disapproval rates remain stubbornly high (Figure 1). Moreover, South Africa continues to have the highest rates of distrust in local government across the continent, rivaling only more politically restricted regimes like Gabon, Morocco, and Sudan (Figure 2). This trend may paradoxically be due to the range of powers devolved to local governments combined with high expectations that voters have about their ability to deliver.
Figure 1. South Africans’ views on local government
Source: Afrobarometer, Rounds 8 (2021) and Round 6 (2015). Shares do not always total to 100 due to a small percentage of “don’t knows” or “refused to answer.”
Figure 2. Distribution of distrust of local government across Africa
Source: Author. Calculated from Round 7 of Afrobarometer (2018).Note: Countries in grey are those where Afrobarometer did not collect the data for the corresponding round.
Unfortunately, in the last several years, many of the municipal councils have become financially insolvent due to poor budgeting practices and substandard revenue collection. In fact, a report by the country’s auditor general revealed that the situation of one-quarter of municipalities was so dire that it was not clear how they could continue operating. Overall, the report gave only 27 of the country’s 257 councils a clean bill of health. Moreover, the electricity utility, Eskom, recently claimed that the municipalities owed it approximately $2.5 billion and accounted for 10 percent of its total debt. These dynamics, in turn, help explain why service delivery remains one of South Africans’ major grievances: In fact, there have been close to 100 protests and demonstrations over local service delivery in South Africa just since the start of 2021.
Conclusions
Globally, local elections do not lead to high turnout, especially nonconcurrent ones—an often-surprising trend given that most citizens’ engagement with their government is most directly at the local level. Encouragingly, again, South Africa contradicts common trends as it historically has had turnout rates of close to 60 percent in the last two local elections, and the assessment by Ipsos also confirms high levels of voter intentions despite the pandemic.
If the reality matches projections, November 1 will surely be a turning point for all the political parties: solidifying allies and enemies for Ramaphosa’s faction of the ANC, testing the DA’s ability to become a national party without a black leader, and signaling the EFF’s willingness to govern rather than simply oppose. Perhaps more importantly, however, it will serve as a warning sign from South Africans that on the local issues that most affect their everyday lives, they will continue to demand and expect better from their politicians.
South Africa’s municipal elections: A referendum on political parties and local democracy
On November 1, South Africans will go to the polls in the sixth round of local government elections since the country’s democratic transition in 1994. Voters will be able to choose among 60,000 candidates and more than 300 political parties to elect councilors for 257 municipalities.
Typically, local elections in sub-Saharan Africa rarely receive much attention. South Africa, however is an exception: Not only is it the region’s most decentralized country, so that local governments have substantive autonomy over services citizens care about, but it’s also a place where local elections are seen as a bellwether for party performance in the general elections. Notably, this electoral contest will be the first since the deadly riots that rocked the country back in July when supporters of the former president, Jacob Zuma, rebelled against his conviction for contempt of court when he failed to attend a corruption inquiry. In addition, with more than 60 percent of South Africa’s population classified as urban, control of the country’s eight large metropolitan areas (known as metros) provides both political leverage and economic clout.
How do the elections work?
South Africa operates a mixed member electoral system for municipal elections, meaning that half the seats on the councils are chosen through proportional representation—whereby the parties receive seats in proportion to the share of votes they receive—and half are chosen through a single-member constituency-based system so that individual candidates who receive the most votes in their ward gain their ward’s seat. In the metros, voters receive two ballots: one for a party and one for a ward councilor. In smaller cities and rural areas, voters also receive a third ballot to choose a party for a district municipality, which encompasses about four to six local municipalities and coordinates cross-boundary development issues. According to the Municipal Structures Act, the newly elected council then chooses an executive committee among their members, which in turn selects the mayor and deputy for the municipality. Compared to a system of direct elections for mayor by voters, this approach encourages more upward accountability to the party, causing the local elections to strongly reflect parties’ organizational capabilities and coherence.
Importance of the 2021 elections to South Africa’s political parties
In the 2016 elections, the African National Congress (ANC)—the leading political party since the end of apartheid in 1994—experienced massive local election losses for the first time ever. Some of the countries’ largest economic centers, including Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay, went to the opposition because the ANC could not obtain outright majorities and had to enter coalitions with other parties. Much of this shift could be attributed to the low popularity of then-President Jacob Zuma in the aftermath of the “State Capture” controversy and the “Fees Must Fall” protests across universities, as well as to the growing attraction of both the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the leadership at that time of Mmusi Maimane and the surprising endurance of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) under the populist Julius Malema. For the 2021 elections, a poll by the public opinion company Ipsos showed that 49 percent of respondents intend to support the ANC on November 1, falling from the 53.9 percent the party obtained in the 2016 contest. This number is still massively higher than the DA and EFF—which respondents claim to support at 17.9 and 14.5 percent, respectively—but depending on the distribution of those votes and seat allocations, could leave the ANC again scrambling to gain majorities in the coveted metros.
Will this contest largely amount to a referendum on the ruling ANC and more importantly, for Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency? The ruling party has intense competing factions, including a divide between pro-Zuma loyalists who could be implicated for corruption, and pro-Ramaphosa supporters who believe internal party reform is critical for regaining citizen support. Already, such rivalries have affected the ability of the ANC to agree on candidates to represent the party across more than 90 wards. More worryingly, they’ve contributed to large-scale political violence and several killings, mostly concentrated in Zuma’s stronghold of Kwa-Zulu Natal province.
The anti-Ramaphosa faction may be hoping that a poor showing will hurt the sitting president and allow others in the party to justify competing against him in the party’s national conference next December. His deputy vice president, David Mabuza, already has announced his intentions to compete against Ramaphosa at that conference. However, control of municipal councils provides the ANC with a huge source of patronage—particularly via access to municipal jobs for local-level party branch members. Therefore, if rivalries among party elites cost the ANC control of major councils, especially the metros, it could affect the party’s ability to retain support among the rank and file in the 2024 general elections.
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The electoral outcome will be equally consequential for the other two main opposition parties, the DA and EFF. The DA recently has faced a series of defections, including in 2019 by Maimane who created the Movement for One South Africa, and Herman Mashaba, the former mayor of Johannesburg, who established the Action South Africa party. Now under the leadership of John Steenhuisen, the party may not be able to break perceptions that it is mostly representative of white privilege and may not gain much ground beyond its traditional stronghold of Cape Town and the Western Province.
The EFF, which took away black votes from the ANC in 2016, could pose a bigger threat for the ruling party in Limpopo—Malema’s home province—and in Gauteng and Northwest. Reports indicate the EFF has gained much more financing for advertisements and handouts than were available in the previous local contest. However, the party’s growing popularity creates a challenge: Unlikely to win outright majorities in most councils, the EFF’s path to governing will rely on entering coalitions with one of the other two big parties. On the one hand, the party’s left-wing, nationalist platform contrasts sharply with the pro-market position of the DA. In fact, DA-EFF coalitions established after the 2016 elections ultimately crumbled in several councils because the two parties operate at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. By the same token, Malema, who relishes attacking the ANC with his combative rhetoric and populist style, would be wary that a compromise with the ANC would alienate EFF supporters. On the other hand, without more substantive experience governing at the local level through such coalitions, it will be difficult for the EFF to gain widespread voter confidence in national elections.
Reinvigorating faith in local government
Perhaps more substantively than foreshadowing political parties’ electoral fortunes in 2024, the elections on November 1 are critical to strengthening local democracy and serve as a mechanism to encourage municipal governments to improve their performance. Based on recently released data from Afrobarometer that was collected in May-June of this year, close to 45 percent of South Africans claim they do “not at all” trust their local government council, and more than 60 percent disapprove or strongly disapprove of the performance of their elected local government councilor. Trust has declined over the last six years while disapproval rates remain stubbornly high (Figure 1). Moreover, South Africa continues to have the highest rates of distrust in local government across the continent, rivaling only more politically restricted regimes like Gabon, Morocco, and Sudan (Figure 2). This trend may paradoxically be due to the range of powers devolved to local governments combined with high expectations that voters have about their ability to deliver.
Figure 1. South Africans’ views on local government
Source: Afrobarometer, Rounds 8 (2021) and Round 6 (2015). Shares do not always total to 100 due to a small percentage of “don’t knows” or “refused to answer.”
Figure 2. Distribution of distrust of local government across Africa
Source: Author. Calculated from Round 7 of Afrobarometer (2018).Note: Countries in grey are those where Afrobarometer did not collect the data for the corresponding round.
Unfortunately, in the last several years, many of the municipal councils have become financially insolvent due to poor budgeting practices and substandard revenue collection. In fact, a report by the country’s auditor general revealed that the situation of one-quarter of municipalities was so dire that it was not clear how they could continue operating. Overall, the report gave only 27 of the country’s 257 councils a clean bill of health. Moreover, the electricity utility, Eskom, recently claimed that the municipalities owed it approximately $2.5 billion and accounted for 10 percent of its total debt. These dynamics, in turn, help explain why service delivery remains one of South Africans’ major grievances: In fact, there have been close to 100 protests and demonstrations over local service delivery in South Africa just since the start of 2021.
Conclusions
Globally, local elections do not lead to high turnout, especially nonconcurrent ones—an often-surprising trend given that most citizens’ engagement with their government is most directly at the local level. Encouragingly, again, South Africa contradicts common trends as it historically has had turnout rates of close to 60 percent in the last two local elections, and the assessment by Ipsos also confirms high levels of voter intentions despite the pandemic.
If the reality matches projections, November 1 will surely be a turning point for all the political parties: solidifying allies and enemies for Ramaphosa’s faction of the ANC, testing the DA’s ability to become a national party without a black leader, and signaling the EFF’s willingness to govern rather than simply oppose. Perhaps more importantly, however, it will serve as a warning sign from South Africans that on the local issues that most affect their everyday lives, they will continue to demand and expect better from their politicians.
What to expect around education at COP26
For the first two weeks of November, all eyes will be on Glasgow as the much-anticipated COP26—the 26th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Convention on Climate Change—unfolds. While climate experts vary on their outlook for an optimistic outcome, one thing is clear: COP26 will be a deciding moment in our collective efforts to draw down greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
World leaders still trying to recover from COVID-19-related setbacks will be looking for bold, transformative climate solutions that put countries on a more equitable path to sustainability.
One such solution that deserves more political attention is education, especially quality education that grounds discussions about climate change in science, transforms harmful social norms and power dynamics that increase the climate vulnerabilities of marginalized groups like women and girls, and connects learning outcomes with climate action and the achievement of climate justice.
As COP26 unfolds, what can we expect from Glasgow when it comes to advancing such education? Here are three things to keep your eyes on and to help amplify.
1. Expect a lot of (good) “noise” from the education sector.
Without a dedicated “day” for education on the COP26 agenda, civil society actors will attempt to draw attention to the important role of education for climate action through an impressive, decentralized roster of side events in the green and blue zones and other sidelines.
These events will add to an unprecedented surge this year in publications and advocacy by global education leaders highlighting the impact of climate change on children (especially girls), the role that education plays in increasing society’s adaptive capacity and climate resilience, and the lackluster progress being made by countries on education for climate action. These include reports published by EarthDay.org, Education International, Malala Fund (and a complementary report by Brookings), Plan International, Save the Children, UNESCO, and UNICEF, among others.
A positive outcome of this increased attention to climate change by the education sector will be the reverse mobilization, that is, increased attention to education by the climate sector.
2. Watch out for a “Glasgow Work Program” for action for climate empowerment.
2020 marked the end of the Doha Work Program, which aimed to guide countries’ implementation of education and training activities as laid out in Article 6 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE). However, a lack of financing commitment by countries to support and implement the development of national ACE strategies means the Doha Work Program—the second ACE work program, running from 2012-2020—was less than effective. This has left ACE a little understood entry point for climate action and a low priority item for negotiations among world leaders.
On top of this, the COVID-19 pandemic sidetracked important momentum-building multilateral and bilateral dialogues that could have helped to create a critical mass of world leaders committed to a more ambitious and fully financed ACE work program. Such missed opportunities mean many ACE negotiators are heading to COP26 without clear incentives, mandates, and goals. Although ACE stakeholders have proposed options for a future work program (delegates are not coming to Glasgow to build the next ACE work program from scratch), the lack of political will around education for climate action threatens to set the new work program on a course to fail.
At this critical juncture in the climate crisis, cooperation rather than competition is needed to ensure our mutual survival—not just as a nascent education and climate sector, but also as present and future generations on this planet.
What we can hope for with the ACE negotiations is that delegates will reach a decision on a 10-year Glasgow Work Program that leans into the recommendations and calls to action by civil society; provides for sufficient funding and technical support, especially to developing countries; centers intergenerational equity, climate justice, and the rights of children and youth, girls and women, and indigenous peoples; aims for societywide empowerment and systemwide transformations; and holds governments accountable through data disaggregated by gender, age, and other relevant social and economic identifiers.
3. Lift up and connect with champions of education for climate action.
We may be witnessing the birth of a global climate and education sector—if not a tipping point in a global movement to strengthen the education sector’s role in climate action. The increasing number of “new” global education organizations arriving at the climate and education agenda, together with the unwavering energy of “older” environmental education and climate change education organizations, feels notably different than just under two years ago. But with few high-level champions at the helm, the possibilities for action seem both endless—unencumbered by political agendas and timelines—but also uncertain and temporary—without political weight. Will the fire fizzle out if financing to education for climate action does not materialize, or if world leaders continue to deprioritize education in favor of “climate-relevant” sectors like energy and transportation?
Short of high-level champions and without an Earth Fund centered solely on education, the sector must work together to lift itself up, identify ways to “do the work” regardless, and resist the internalized institutional urge for its members to compete against each other for resources. At this critical juncture in the climate crisis, cooperation rather than competition is needed to ensure our mutual survival—not just as a nascent education and climate sector, but also as present and future generations on this planet.
COP26 offers us an opportunity to identify and invite new education champions for climate action into “the tent.” We have two weeks to configure new connections among local and global actors, and a rapidly closing window thereafter to make a difference through our collective work. What are you waiting for? Let’s get started.
Related Content
What to expect around education at COP26
For the first two weeks of November, all eyes will be on Glasgow as the much-anticipated COP26—the 26th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Convention on Climate Change—unfolds. While climate experts vary on their outlook for an optimistic outcome, one thing is clear: COP26 will be a deciding moment in our collective efforts to draw down greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
World leaders still trying to recover from COVID-19-related setbacks will be looking for bold, transformative climate solutions that put countries on a more equitable path to sustainability.
One such solution that deserves more political attention is education, especially quality education that grounds discussions about climate change in science, transforms harmful social norms and power dynamics that increase the climate vulnerabilities of marginalized groups like women and girls, and connects learning outcomes with climate action and the achievement of climate justice.
As COP26 unfolds, what can we expect from Glasgow when it comes to advancing such education? Here are three things to keep your eyes on and to help amplify.
1. Expect a lot of (good) “noise” from the education sector.
Without a dedicated “day” for education on the COP26 agenda, civil society actors will attempt to draw attention to the important role of education for climate action through an impressive, decentralized roster of side events in the green and blue zones and other sidelines.
These events will add to an unprecedented surge this year in publications and advocacy by global education leaders highlighting the impact of climate change on children (especially girls), the role that education plays in increasing society’s adaptive capacity and climate resilience, and the lackluster progress being made by countries on education for climate action. These include reports published by EarthDay.org, Education International, Malala Fund (and a complementary report by Brookings), Plan International, Save the Children, UNESCO, and UNICEF, among others.
A positive outcome of this increased attention to climate change by the education sector will be the reverse mobilization, that is, increased attention to education by the climate sector.
2. Watch out for a “Glasgow Work Program” for action for climate empowerment.
2020 marked the end of the Doha Work Program, which aimed to guide countries’ implementation of education and training activities as laid out in Article 6 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE). However, a lack of financing commitment by countries to support and implement the development of national ACE strategies means the Doha Work Program—the second ACE work program, running from 2012-2020—was less than effective. This has left ACE a little understood entry point for climate action and a low priority item for negotiations among world leaders.
On top of this, the COVID-19 pandemic sidetracked important momentum-building multilateral and bilateral dialogues that could have helped to create a critical mass of world leaders committed to a more ambitious and fully financed ACE work program. Such missed opportunities mean many ACE negotiators are heading to COP26 without clear incentives, mandates, and goals. Although ACE stakeholders have proposed options for a future work program (delegates are not coming to Glasgow to build the next ACE work program from scratch), the lack of political will around education for climate action threatens to set the new work program on a course to fail.
At this critical juncture in the climate crisis, cooperation rather than competition is needed to ensure our mutual survival—not just as a nascent education and climate sector, but also as present and future generations on this planet.
What we can hope for with the ACE negotiations is that delegates will reach a decision on a 10-year Glasgow Work Program that leans into the recommendations and calls to action by civil society; provides for sufficient funding and technical support, especially to developing countries; centers intergenerational equity, climate justice, and the rights of children and youth, girls and women, and indigenous peoples; aims for societywide empowerment and systemwide transformations; and holds governments accountable through data disaggregated by gender, age, and other relevant social and economic identifiers.
3. Lift up and connect with champions of education for climate action.
We may be witnessing the birth of a global climate and education sector—if not a tipping point in a global movement to strengthen the education sector’s role in climate action. The increasing number of “new” global education organizations arriving at the climate and education agenda, together with the unwavering energy of “older” environmental education and climate change education organizations, feels notably different than just under two years ago. But with few high-level champions at the helm, the possibilities for action seem both endless—unencumbered by political agendas and timelines—but also uncertain and temporary—without political weight. Will the fire fizzle out if financing to education for climate action does not materialize, or if world leaders continue to deprioritize education in favor of “climate-relevant” sectors like energy and transportation?
Short of high-level champions and without an Earth Fund centered solely on education, the sector must work together to lift itself up, identify ways to “do the work” regardless, and resist the internalized institutional urge for its members to compete against each other for resources. At this critical juncture in the climate crisis, cooperation rather than competition is needed to ensure our mutual survival—not just as a nascent education and climate sector, but also as present and future generations on this planet.
COP26 offers us an opportunity to identify and invite new education champions for climate action into “the tent.” We have two weeks to configure new connections among local and global actors, and a rapidly closing window thereafter to make a difference through our collective work. What are you waiting for? Let’s get started.
Related Content
Figure of the week: Education participation rates in Africa increase, with some caveats
On September 18, the African Union, in collaboration with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) released the report, “Transforming Education in Africa,” an evidence-based overview of education in the region. The report highlights progress the continent has made on education indicators, such as participation rates, while also illustrating challenges that remain. As Africa has the youngest population in the world—nearly 800 million Africans are under the age of 25, with 677 million between ages 3 and 24—accelerating investment in education is vital for countries to take full benefit of their human capital.
Overall, the report reveals both progress and regression when it comes to education in the region. For example, although Africa has made progress in increasing children’s participation in school (Figure 1), the authors speculate that the absolute number of out-of-school children has actually increased since 2010, given rapid population growth.
Figure 1. Share of out-of-school children in Africa, by age group
Source: “Transforming Education in Africa,” African Union, 2021.
More specifically, according to the report, approximately 42 million children of primary and secondary school age are not enrolled in school. Regionally, western Africa accounts for the highest number of out-of-school children: 2 out of 5 out-of-school children in sub-Saharan Africa live in western Africa (Figure 2). Eastern Africa follows with 34 percent of Africa’s out-of-school children.
Figure 2. Distribution of out-of-school children of primary and secondary school age in Africa by region
Source: “Transforming Education in Africa,” African Union, 2021.
More specifically, in western Africa, 27 percent of primary school-age children, 37 percent of lower-secondary school-age children, and 56 percent of upper-secondary school-age children were not enrolled in school in 2019.
The report states that bottlenecks and barriers to improving education include broader educational policies and legal frameworks and conflict and security. Specifically, within policies and legal frameworks, the authors state that, although basic education is usually compulsory, legal measures for implementation are lacking, which creates a disconnect between expected learning outcomes and effective implementation of cost-effective interventions. Demand barriers, such as the imbalance between education and labor needs can prevent children attending school on a regular basis, hindering education improvement. On the supply side, teacher shortages can lead to large class sizes where child-centered learning is difficult. Finally, conflict and insecurity situations, especially when learning institutions are targeted, inhibit children from having access to learning.
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To combat these barriers the authors recommend, among other actions, investigating the underlying reasons individuals fail to participate in education to design policy, investing in development of more resilient education systems, and improving education data and management information systems. The authors state that a substantial number of students drop out of school. Investigating the reasoning behind this could aid in policy creation that motivates students to stay in school. To address lack of resiliency in education systems, the authors say that taking a well-rounded approach that includes assessment, management, and monitoring and evaluation tools will aid in making sure that education systems function continuously. Finally, the authors state that evidenced-based information is key to education systems making progress, and so encourage further research.
For the full report, see here. Also check out “Improving learning and life skills for marginalized children: Scaling the Learner Guide Program in Tanzania” by the Brookings Institution’s Center for Universal Education for more on innovations in education in the region.