“There are things known and there are things unknown, and in between are the doors of perception.”
CIA & MI6 Heads on Kursk Offensive
Earlier this month, SIS Chief Richard Moore and CIA Director Bill Burns made a joint debut public appearance at the FT Weekend Festival to discuss U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation and global geopolitics.
In the interview, Moore described the Ukrainian army's surprise offensive into Russia’s Kursk region as:
“A typically audacious and bold move on the part of the Ukrainians to try to change the game… and I think they have, to a degree, changed the narrative around this…”
Regardless of one’s views on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the courage displayed by the Ukrainian resistance is undeniable. Few would dispute the right of any nation or group to mount a resistance when their sovereignty is under threat—not just in this conflict, but in principle.
Other offhand remarks made by the intelligence chiefs about dissent within the Kremlin elite were largely aimed at appeasing the audience. These statements may neither be proven nor disproven, as little new is typically revealed in public forums. Most of the content serves to reinforce existing narratives—whether accurate or not. The interviews mainly solidify talking points, rather than providing fresh insights into state secrets. The interesting stuff is discussed behind closed doors at private hearings.
Moore’s statement likely represents the furthest an intelligence officer can go in balancing the delivery of enough content to generate favorable headlines, while maintaining credibility among peers. Encryption of communication is second nature for those in the intelligence community. In this instance, a basic understanding of the topic is enough to recognize that Moore wasn't disclosing anything beyond what is already common knowledge among military intelligence analysts. An outlier position would have been to declare the Kursk offensive as a major strategic and political triumph.
Side note: Bill Burns' memoirs The Back Channel, written in 2019 before he became CIA Director, is well worth a read. His long and distinguished career as a U.S. diplomat is, by most accounts, exemplary. Also, here's another character assassination attempt by the WSJ on Burns' former colleague, Bob Malley. How dare a diplomat engage with the adversary?
A Smart Idea?
There’s no doubt that NATO provides vital arms, operational, and intelligence support to Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. Sometimes, Ukraine's allies go to great lengths to maintain plausible deniability. However, it remains more likely than not that neither U.S. nor UK intelligence directly advised Ukraine on the planning or execution of the Kursk offensive. This raises questions about the extent of Western influence over Ukraine or whether the Kursk operation signals desperation on the part of Ukraine—or the West—at the potential cost of losing elite forces and yielding territories in the Donetsk region.
Reality Check of the Maps
It becomes dicey when mainstream narratives diverge from realities on the ground. This is especially true in the age of alternative media sources. There's a “ragtag” group in Afghanistan that put very little effort into controlling war narratives, but can credibly claim to have defeated both the Red Army and U.S. coalition forces.
Here’s a snapshot of how frontline activities in the Kursk region have evolved over the past week, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW):
ISW map updates often resemble a banker quick to mark up winning positions but slow to write down losses. The scale of the maps in the corner shows the relative significance of events.
Tactical vs. Strategical Thinking
As Mike Kofman noted 4-5 days after the Kursk offensive was first reported in early August: “This is an operation that looks good on day 4, but probably not so great on day 40.” Thus, the initial suggestion that the Kursk offensive would strengthen Ukraine’s position in future territorial negotiations with Russia now seems less likely. Meanwhile, Russian advances in Donetsk have accelerated since the Kursk operation began.
If it turns out that the Kursk operation was advised and planned by Ukraine's Western allies, then heads must surely roll. Otherwise, good people will leave the civil service. Worse still, the despondent and cash-strapped ones may defect to the adversary.
