Speevr | Finance

Cross-border crisis simulation exercise in South America

This report sets out general findings and recommendations on a range of topics, including crisis management tools; recovery and resolution planning; liquidity and resolution funding; domestic decision-making procedures; and cross-border cooperation and information-sharing.

A taxonomy of sustainable finance taxonomies

Sustainable finance taxonomies can play an important role in scaling up sustainable finance and, in turn, in supporting the achievement of high-level goals such as the Paris Accord and the UN sustainable development goals. This paper develops a framework to classify and compare existing taxonomies. Several weaknesses emerge from this classification and comparison, including the lack of usage of relevant and measurable sustainability performance indicators, a lack of granularity and lack of verification of achieved sustainability benefits. On this basis, the paper proposes key principles for the design of effective taxonomies.

Regulating stablecoins isn’t just about avoiding systemic risk

It’s good news that financial regulators are focused on figuring out what to do about stablecoins because their growth is creating significant risks. But there’s a bigger picture here than how to bring these new instruments within the regulatory perimeter, or how to regulate crypto generally, even though these are important. The bigger issue is how do we modernize our payments system? This should be a Biden administration priority because it would help low-income people in particular.

Timothy G. Massad

Senior Fellow – The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Former Chairman – Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Former Assistant Secretary – Treasury for Financial Stability

The connection between stablecoins and helping low-income people might seem unlikely because stablecoins are primarily used today to speculate on cryptocurrencies. While their growth has led financial regulators to worry about potential systemic risks, that growth is partly because of deficiencies in our payments system, and those deficiencies are a major reason why the U.S. lags behind other developed nations in financial inclusion. Stablecoins have potentially much broader application. Properly regulated, they are one means—although clearly not the only means—of curing some of those payment system deficiencies. Thus, financial regulators should not only address the risks that stablecoins pose but keep their aim on that broader goal of modernizing our payments system and improving access to the financial system.
This paper discusses (1) why stablecoins are a problem; (2) how we should regulate stablecoins; and (3) the bigger picture about modernizing payments and improving financial access.
The risks of stablecoins
Stablecoins are digital tokens whose value is pegged to the dollar (or another currency or asset). They serve to grease the wheels of the crypto industry, enabling investors to easily transfer value between different crypto exchanges and cryptocurrencies without converting back and forth into dollars. Settlement is instant, thus avoiding delays of other means of payment. This function coupled with explosive growth in the crypto currency market explains why the market capitalization of stablecoins has increased from $20 billion twelve months ago to over $120 billion today1.
Figure 1: Market capitalization of stablecoins, January 2017 to August 2021

Stablecoins are currently not regulated in any meaningful way. While some issuers have state licenses, these impose minimal requirements. There are no standards requiring issuers to protect reserves or maintain liquidity. I have written about how a sudden spike in demand for repayment could cause a stablecoin to “break the buck” the same way the Reserve Primary Fund did in September of 2008, which triggered a run on money market mutual funds that was only stopped when the Treasury issued a guarantee of money market mutual fund liabilities.

Related Content

2021
Sep
30

Past Event

Regulating cryptocurrencies and future technologies: A conversation with Manuel P. Alvarez

12:00 PM –

1:00 PM EDT

Washington

Financial Regulation
Can fintech improve health?

Aaron Klein
Friday, September 24, 2021

Financial Regulation
Where are the Biden financial regulators?

Peter Conti-Brown
Tuesday, August 17, 2021

Although stablecoins are currently not used widely outside of the crypto industry, they have the potential for much broader application. Stablecoins first garnered wide attention in June 2019 when Facebook proposed creating “a simple global currency”2 or stablecoin called Libra that would be pegged to a basket of fiat currencies including the dollar and the euro. That proposal provoked harsh criticism, both because of its sponsor3 as well as its design. Central bankers feared it would undermine sovereign currencies and monetary policies4. The proposal has since been renamed Diem and redesigned as a set of stablecoins, each tied to an individual fiat currency. It is not operational, in part, because Facebook promised in Congressional hearings that it would not launch the idea unless regulators approved, and they have not done so. Other stablecoin issuers did not ask for permission, and their tokens have grown enormously, which has finally prompted regulators to consider acting.
How to regulate stablecoins
In July, Treasury Secretary Yellen convened the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to discuss stablecoins. The PWG does not have any power to actually do anything about stablecoins, however. Instead, Treasury staff will soon issue a report that will recommend a path forward, which could include a mix of recommendations for actions by different regulatory agencies and potentially Congress.
The best option is to have the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) commence a review. Under Title VIII of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the FSOC can require regulation of a “payment activity” that it determines “is, or is likely to become, systemically important.”5 The FSOC has broad powers to get information from institutions engaged in an activity that it has reasonable cause to believe meets the standard for such a designation. That type of inquiry is much needed given the lack of transparency about stablecoins.
The law sets forth criteria for making the systemically important designation, which include size as well as the effect that the failure or disruption of the activity would have on critical markets, financial institutions, or the broader financial system. Under Title VIII, the FSOC has designated two operators of business payment systems as systemically important financial market utilities, but it has never designated an activity generally nor an entity engaged primarily in retail payments. The “likely to become” phrase is not in Title I, under which FSOC designated four entities following the global financial crisis. It is clearly relevant to the concern that, unless regulated, stablecoins could continue to grow dramatically.
Having been a member of the FSOC for three years, I believe an FSOC review will be useful even if it decides against a systemically important designation. The FSOC can still be the forum for making a sound choice among the alternative paths, which involve different regulators who comprise the FSOC. There is a good argument that stablecoins could be regulated as bank deposits under existing law. Section 21 of Glass Steagall (which survived despite repeal of much of that law) prohibits anyone from receiving a bank deposit unless subject to regulatory oversight under specific exceptions.
There is also the option of regulating stablecoins as securities or as money market funds. Securities and Exchange Commission chair Gary Gensler has suggested he might move to do so and has referred to the PWG report as something that his staff is working on with Secretary Yellen. Although I have compared stablecoin risks to those of money market funds, I do not think that is the best way to regulate them. They are fundamentally payment devices and not investments. Classifying them as securities would also appear to pre-empt a systemic importance determination as part of the payment authority given by Dodd Frank since the definition of “payment, settlement and clearing activity” for purposes of FSOC’s jurisdiction excludes “any offer or sale of a security under the Securities Act.” The PWG report will presumably indicate which path of this fork the Biden administration will pursue.
Another option is to recommend to Congress that it enact new authority. Various bills have been introduced to address stablecoins, including one that would limit issuance to entities that are banks. But at a time when the Biden administration and Congress already have many weighty legislative priorities, rapid enactment of legislation seems doubtful.
If the FSOC does reach a determination of systemic importance, the Federal Reserve would be charged with developing “risk management standards” that “promote robust risk management; promote safety and soundness; reduce systemic risks; and support the stability of the broader financial system.”6
The path chosen may affect the comprehensiveness of the regulatory framework that can be created, though we should put in place what we can now and add to it later if necessary.   Ideally, we need a framework that includes not just traditional prudential regulation standards, but also operational risk measures, consumer protection standards, and standards to achieve interoperability. Regulators should require that reserves are invested in bank deposits, Treasuries, or other safe, liquid assets, and that there are liquidity requirements. If the Federal Reserve were to broaden who is eligible for a master account, then stablecoin providers which are not banks could park reserves at the Fed, an option some would argue is even safer because it would avoid the operational risk of a particular bank. Regulators should require a capital buffer even if reserves are invested in cash or other safe assets. That is because capital can protect against other types of losses, such as operational ones. Regulators may also want to ban the payment of interest to discourage users from maintaining large deposits. That plus requiring reserves to be invested in cash or other safe assets would likely mean that stablecoins would be attractive only as payment instruments, not as investments. A prohibition on interest would put stablecoins at a disadvantage relative to bank deposits if interest rates rise, but regulators might desire that in these early days of the industry. Compliance with “know your customer,” anti-money laundering, and other laws combatting the financing of terrorism is crucial.
There should also be operational resilience standards. This is a huge area of risk often overlooked in commentary that focuses on stablecoin financial risks. Stablecoins run on decentralized blockchains and smart contracts. The software for the various layers of operation could have flaws or could be vulnerable to attack. The largest stablecoins run on multiple blockchains but are separate and distinct tokens on each such blockchain, as a recent post by Neha Narula of MIT explains. That means risks associated with the integrity and reliability of the blockchains and software are multiplied. In addition, a stablecoin could become too large in relation to the capacity of the blockchain itself. Federal Reserve staff are presumably becoming knowledgeable about these issues through their collaboration with MIT to design a hypothetical central bank digital currency platform.
The regulatory framework should also include requirements for adequate disclosure of information to customers, rights of recourse, and standards on protection of customer information, including on how a customer’s data can be used. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may have a role to play in this regard. Finally, we may want to create standards that ensure interoperability between different stablecoins to avoid a fragmented system.
One other advantage of an FSOC process is that the presence of representatives of state banking and securities regulators on the council may help figure out how state regulation of stablecoins—which exists, but is quite limited—should mesh with federal standards.
Both the PWG and the FSOC are well suited to examining risks generated by financial markets.   The PWG was created in response to the 1987 stock market crash; the FSOC was created in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. But whatever path is chosen for going forward, the goal should be not just to regulate risks of this particular innovation but to address deficiencies in the payment system that are a principal reason for the growth of stablecoins.
How regulating stablecoins can advance financial inclusion
While stablecoin usage has largely been in the crypto industry, their impact has already been broader. As Federal Reserve chairman Powell said in discussing Facebook’s Libra proposal, the concept “lit a fire” under central bankers to consider central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).   Both stablecoins and CBDCs are ways to remedy deficiencies of our payments system and potentially enhance financial inclusion. As financial regulators address the risks of stablecoins, they should articulate that larger goal of modernizing our payments system and increasing access to the financial system.
Banks handle the vast majority of U.S. dollar payments in a safe and well-tested manner. But the system is characterized by relatively high cost, weak competition, and insufficient innovation. Americans pay significantly more than Europeans for payment services, particularly because of high fees paid for credit cards. The system is also slow relative to real-time payments increasingly common in other countries.
Most Americans might say the system is fine. We don’t notice interchange fees paid by merchants because they are rolled into prices, and our credit cards give us free revolving credit, cash back, frequent flyer miles, or other rewards. Nor is anyone who has some savings likely to be inconvenienced if a check takes a couple days to clear.
But the flaws of the system weigh much more heavily on those in lower-income brackets. Those who live paycheck to paycheck are at risk of incurring significant overdraft fees when checks don’t clear quickly. The fact that approximately 70%7 of those who use check cashing services have bank accounts is clear evidence that something is wrong with the payments system. In addition, because people with lower incomes have fewer credit cards—they use more prepaid cards and debit cards, which don’t offer the same benefits—the credit card costs embedded in prices fall disproportionately on them.
It is shocking that with a financial system as sophisticated as ours, 25% of American households are unbanked or “underbanked,” according to the FDIC. The latter term means they have a bank account but use nonbank options like check cashing services or payday lenders, often to avoid even more expensive bank overdraft charges. Moreover, as Aaron Klein has written in an excellent new paper, the key issue is access to digital money, and low-income people are at a distinct disadvantage in that regard.
Stablecoins are one way to speed up payments, as are CBDCs. The original Libra proposal focused on its potential financial inclusion benefits. While some might regard that as window dressing by Facebook, the fact is that slow and expensive payments burden low income people in many ways. Remittances—a $700 billion market of sending money from one country to another—is a prime example, as the average cost exceeds 6%.
A retail CBDC could be a means of providing bank accounts as well.8 Of course, the banking industry is quick to cry out that this would disintermediate the banking system—because deposits would leave commercial banks and move to the Fed—and result in less lending and credit creation. But there are many design choices for CBDCs. One option is to create no frills, minimal retail accounts with deposit limits, which might help the unbanked and underbanked without draining away significant deposits. We could also mandate banks to provide such low or no-cost accounts.
These are not the only solutions, and some will argue that existing private and public sector initiatives are sufficient to modernize the system. The Federal Reserve’s new real-time payments system, FedNow, is due to be operational in 2023 and that will surely help. But it needs to be coupled with regulatory changes that will create more competition, or banks may only offer those services within their “walled gardens”.
The real issue is increasing competition—either from new private sector entrants or effectively from the government through a CBDC. Regulators can’t fix the system’s deficiencies as they move to regulate stablecoins, but they can frame the issue in that context. The big picture is that stablecoins have grown enormously because they offer distinct advantages in speed. Banks have not sufficiently modernized the system nor addressed financial inclusion. Changes in regulation may be needed to permit greater competition and facilitate innovation. The Biden administration should make this a national priority.

Macroeconomic policy under a managed float: a simple integrated framework

by Pierre-Richard Agénor and Luiz Awazu Pereira da SilvaThis paper presents a simple integrated macroeconomic model of a small, bank-dependent open economy with a managed float and financial frictions.

Central bank digital currencies – executive summary

A group of seven central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and Swiss National Bank), together with the Bank for International Settlements, are working together to explore central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) for the public (“general purpose” or “retail” CBDC).

Big tech regulation: what is going on?

FSI Insights No 36, September 2021. This paper reviews various regulatory initiatives developed in China, the European Union and the United States to address new challenges presented by big techs.. It offers a typology of regulatory actions and focusses on five policy domains: competition, data, conduct of business, operational resilience and financial stability.

Enabling open finance through APIs: report on payment initiation

Report by the Consultative Group on Innovation and the Digital Economy (CGIDE) established at the BIS Representative Office for the Americas.

The risks of US-EU divergence on corporate sustainability disclosure

Sustainability disclosure is in vogue, with more than 80 percent of major global companies reporting on some aspects of their social and environmental impacts. This is partly driven by growing calls for transparency by civil society organizations and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investors, who are demanding detailed and verified corporate sustainability information. ESG investments—assets that fulfill certain minimum social and environmental criteria—grew by more than 40 percent in 2020 in the U.S., and currently make up one-third of all assets under management. However, the process of classifying financial assets as ESG is unregulated in the U.S. Moreover, the data required to assess if ESG assets have achieved a positive social and environmental impact is often missing, incomplete, unreliable, or unstandardized.

The U.S. and the EU are pursuing different trajectories in regulating ESG investing and sustainability disclosures. The U.S. is following a laissez-faire approach with sustainable investing and disclosure being guided by voluntary, private-sector-led processes, protocols, and guidelines. Compliance is driven by peer pressure and the competitive drive to build an image as a sustainable, accountable business. In the absence of regulatory intervention, institutional investors that manage index funds—in particular BlackRock, Vanguard, and Mainstreet—have stepped in to take state-like roles by putting pressure on corporations to address systematic risks like climate change.
These voluntary mechanisms, however, have been criticized for being inadequate. Corporations are routinely accused of “greenwashing” their sustainability reports by overstating their positive environmental and social impact and downplaying negative ones. In the absence of detailed, verified information, asset managers can fall prey to greenwashing and classify securities of unsustainable companies as ESG assets. This leaves ESG investors with little assurance, legal or otherwise, that their money has been put to the intended use.
The EU priming for a green future
The EU, on the other hand, is following a systematic and centralized approach toward climate transition and sustainability disclosure. Its regulatory regime is underpinned by the European Climate Law that legally endorses the EU’s commitment to meet the Paris agreement. To achieve climate neutrality by 2050, the continental body has introduced a slew of regulatory measures that will accelerate capital allocation toward green investments.
One of these is the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) that was introduced in April 2021. It upgrades the 2014 nonfinancial reporting directive and seeks to improve the coverage and reliability of sustainability reporting. When the law comes into effect in 2023, the CSRD is expected to increase the number of European and Europe-based companies that disclose sustainability information by fourfold, to 49,000 in total.
The CSRD proposal applies the “double materiality” principle, requiring companies to disclose information that is material for the enterprise as well as for its societal stakeholders and/or the environment. For example, it requires companies to disclose the extent to which their activities are compatible with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Importantly, the directive requires companies to seek “limited” assurance by third-party auditors.

The directive is also unique for requiring companies to report their sustainability performance using EU-wide disclosure standards. The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), a private association with strong links with the European Commission, has been tasked with the difficult job of developing these disclosure standards. EFRAG intends to build on existing, third-party sustainability reporting standards and has initiated a collaboration with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), currently the most widely used reporting standard globally.
Alongside a similar sustainability disclosure law that regulates processes of ESG investing in financial institutions, the CSRD is expected to significantly improve transparency in European capital markets. These measures are also likely to increase the adoption of sustainability goals and targets among European corporations, further widening the existing disclosure gap between EU-based and U.S.-based corporations.
A change of heart at the SEC
Until recently, American regulators have been reluctant to mandate sustainability disclosure. At a recent Brookings webinar, Securities Exchanges Commission (SEC) Commissioner Hester Peirce offered the rationale why ESG rule-making is beyond the mandate of the SEC, reflecting the longstanding view among Republican commissioners at the SEC. Her long list of justifications includes some plausible ones, such as the broad and elastic nature of the ESG concept that would make it ill-suited as a domain of disclosure rule-making. Others were highly slanted, such as the contention that ESG disclosure could drive financial instability by leading to excessive allocation of capital to supposedly green technologies. This is ironic because the lack of ESG disclosure mandate is not slowing down the rapid growth of ESG investments; it is only making the process opaque and ineffective, making stock market volatilities more rather than less likely. In fact, the EU’s key justification for sustainability disclosure is preventing systemic risks that threaten financial stability.

The SEC, which now has a 3-2 Democratic majority and a Biden-appointed chairman, has of late shown keenness to play a more active regulatory role. In May 2020, its Investor Advisory Committee provided recommendations that urged the commission to set up mandatory reporting requirements on ESG issues. In December 2020, an ESG subcommittee issued a preliminary recommendation that called for the adoption of mandatory standards for disclosing material ESG risks. The recommendation, however, called for limited disclosure covering a narrow range of metrics tailored by industry, in a manner similar to the standards of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, while warning against the “highly prescriptive” standards that were purportedly adopted by the EU. In March 2021, the commission solicited public input on climate change disclosures, which revealed strong demand for mandatory sustainability disclosure.
Divergent disclosure laws
The SEC is thus set to adopt mandatory ESG disclosure rules, perhaps as early as October 2021. These rules, however, are likely to depart from the EU’s approach in a number of ways. First, an SEC regulation will target only publicly listed companies; the EU’s CSRD, on the other hand, covers large unlisted firms as well. Second, the SEC will mandate disclosure of a narrow range of outcomes related to climate risk and human capital, while the EU will mandate disclosure of a broader set of sustainability outcomes, including indirect outcomes through the value chain and relevant corporate strategies and processes. Third, given capacity constraints, the SEC will likely adopt less comprehensive, third-party disclosure standards as opposed to developing its own comprehensive standards as the EU intends to do. Facing pressure from Republican lawmakers and interest groups, the SEC’s measures are also likely to be timid, focusing only on protecting (ESG) investors through the narrow lens of financial materiality.
By comparison, the relatively wide coverage of the EU’s new disclosure law (CSRD) will lead to significant improvements in data availability. The use of uniform disclosure standards will also ensure that companies provide more detailed and comprehensive sustainability information. It is, however, less obvious how the directive will improve data quality and reliability. The requirement for limited assurance will reduce the most overt forms of greenwashing but is unlikely to eliminate disclosure of data with dubious quality. For example, such an assurance is unlikely to guarantee that a company used the most recent or robust method for assessing its carbon footprint.
The EU’s law is also unlikely to address the lack of standardization, which is to a degree inherent to ESG metrics. Sustainability disclosure will contain significant company-specific, qualitative data, including retrospective and forward-looking statements that are hard to quantify. The EU’s reporting standards will give managers significant discretion on what to disclose and how, and they impose different requirements for companies that differ by sector and size. More nuanced and detailed sustainability disclosure is more valuable to individual (ESG) investors though, at a macro level, this increases the cost of standardizing, comparing, and verifying the reported data. The search for the “holy grail” of the ideal ESG index will thus continue, hampered by the difficulty to converge on what categories of ESG are universally relevant, how to define their scope, which sets of metrics to use, and how to weigh and aggregate them.
A missed opportunity for coordination?
In both the EU and U.S., the move toward greater corporate transparency will help improve the existing power imbalance between shareholders and stakeholders. The lack of verified disclosure today discourages corporations from reporting unsavory business practices that have devastating societal and environmental impact. Greater transparency, stronger regulatory oversight, and more robust third-party ESG assessment can lead to better public understanding of the positive and negative externalities that corporations create, allowing the market to reward “good” ones and penalize “bad” ones. At the same time, given significant informational asymmetries and inevitable loopholes in principles-based disclosure standards, the tendency of corporations to understate their negative externalities is likely to persist, making greenwashing largely inescapable in the foreseeable future.
These challenges are further exacerbated by the lack of coordination to develop globally acceptable disclosure standards. Conflicting regulatory regimes between the U.S. and EU will harm trade and investment flows across the Atlantic and potentially globally. Frictions are already emerging in the context of the EU’s forthcoming carbon border adjustment mechanism, which will impose tariffs on imports from countries without carbon taxes. In the end, coordination at a global scale is needed to regulate corporate sustainability in a manner that does not sand the wheels of the global trading system.

Can fintech improve health?

Abstract
Access to electronic financial services, in particular digital money, has replaced the digital divide as an unintended yet significant barrier for low-income individuals to participate in new technologies, including those that lead to better health outcomes. This paper explores this problem in depth. It begins by describing and documenting the barriers, costs, and benefits to accessing and using digital money. Next, the paper turns to implications of the broader technological revolution on the nature of money and payment systems. This includes an examination into the structure of our banking and payment systems and their overlay into different demographic groups of Americans. The paper then explores the ramifications of disparity in access to digital money for physical health including an analysis of how the COVID-19 pandemic amplified existing problems. It concludes with a set of recommendations to ameliorate the problems identified.

The paper finds that access to digital money is an underappreciated vector by which technological innovation, both financial and non-financial, can be hindered in reaching certain populations. Accessing digital money is easy and free for those with money while for those without a lot of money, digital money is expensive. Digital money’s role as a barrier to accessing new technology, particularly in an app/mobile/online economy, will likely exacerbate existing inequalities and impede adoption of some new technology for lower-income people. To the extent that these new technologies offer health benefits and require digital money, existing public health inequalities will be exacerbated. Fully realizing the potential health and wealth benefits of new technology requires a better solution to the digital payment divide than currently exists.
Key Findings
America’s payment system is designed to segregate people by income and wealth. Access to digital payments is more expensive and difficult to obtain for lower-income households and racial minorities despite decades of continuing growth of usage of digital money. This results in barriers to adoption of new technology, which increasingly requires digital payments. The response to the COVID-19 pandemic exposed several consequences of this problem, resulting in reduced effectiveness of pandemic response and potentially greater health risks due to a lack of access to digital payments.
Linkages between income, wealth, and physical and mental health have been documented. However, prior research has not generally considered the role of payments and access to digital money as impacting either income or health. This paper argues that access to digital money has a direct impact on financial well-being and consequently should factor into determinants of health. In addition, the inability to access digital money easily and cheaply may factor into other elements that have been studied as part of the broader social determinants of health, specifically the ability to access new technologies that require digital payments.
A specific new finding in the paper is that the majority of Americans who use check cashers and the majority of checks cashed are from people with bank accounts. This challenges the notion that being “unbanked” drives use of certain “fringe financial services” such as check cashers. Issues around cost, including the value of immediate payment, drive decisions on how best to access money, whether through bank products or non-bank products.
Table 1: Use of check cashing services, by banking status

The main policy solutions discussed center on enhancing access to digital payments through expansions of the provision of low-cost financial services. The goal is universal access to digital payments at low/no-cost, which should reduce the inequality effects of new technology. A set of policy solutions are being discussed, but more analysis is needed to ensure that proposed solutions correctly identify and address the key challenges, which are primarily centered around cost and timeliness rather than physical locations, hours of operation, or the creation of new forms of digital currency. Inaction in solving these problems intensifies inequality, hampers responses to future pandemics, and reduces the efficacy of other solutions designed to improve public health. The status quo is not static. Technology continues to develop. Absent substantial reform of our nation’s banking and payment systems that lower the cost of accessing and transacting in digital money, millions of Americans will be unable to fully benefit from technological advancement, and that is likely to have health consequences.
Download the full report here.

BIS Quarterly Review, September 2021

BIS Quarterly Review for September 2021 – Risky asset and sovereign bond markets seemed to send mixed signals during the period under review.