“Da media vuelta, danza Maduro No te canse' ahora, que esto solo empieza”
In this update, we present a comprehensive report summarizing the latest views on the Ukraine war from four experts on Russia and European affairs—each from a distinct perspective.
First, an update on key developments in recent days from a range of open sources:
• Several Russia-focused political commentators in the West say Putin is under domestic pressure to hasten the Ukraine offensive—whether from technocrats keen to alleviate the war’s economic burden or from hardliners demanding he stand up to Western taunts and prove Russia is not a “paper tiger.” We cannot verify these claims given information controls inside Russia.
• Yesterday, Putin stated that Russia is launching an average of 500–600 drones into Ukraine per day, a figure echoed by several milbloggers in recent weeks.
• According to official reports, the United States will soon decide whether to provide Ukraine—via European NATO members—with more advanced medium-range missile systems (e.g., Tomahawk) to strike deep inside Russian territory. The Kremlin previously warned that such an escalation would amount to a direct military confrontation with NATO, given that these systems cannot be launched without U.S. intelligence and targeting support.
• There are reports that the Republic of Belarus has very recently taken delivery of the much-discussed Oreshnik missiles from Russia, deploying them on its territory. Given the Oreshnik’s medium-range ballistic profile, it is reasonable to infer that their positioning in Belarus is intended for targets beyond Ukraine. One might note the sequencing: sanctions relief from Washington, then Oreshniks from Moscow. Gotta hand it to Lukashenko.
• Earlier this week (on 1 October), President Macron ordered French forces to be on high alert in preparation for a potential imminent Russian attack. Most of the mounting tension in Europe is centered on the Baltic region.
• The Russian army has announced its largest conscription-based mobilization effort in more than a decade.
Taken together with increasingly tough rhetoric toward Russia from some European leaders, the mood is not encouraging.
The picture in the Middle East and Caribbean looks even bleaker. There’s a harebrained idea, led by Marco Rubio, for a decapitation strike by U.S. special forces to topple the Maduro regime.
Neocons never learn: same playbook, same failures, same blowback. On their best days, it’s selective facts, a spun-up narrative, and the ritual claim that the adversary is on its last legs—conditions that more accurately describe the home front. On their worst, it’s manufactured consent built on lies and falsified intelligence.
Here’s what the experts say:
Europe, Russia, and the Ukraine War: What’s Real, What’s Rhetoric
Sources: Mark Galeotti, Richard Atwood, Olga Oliker and Steve Pompa.
Lede
Europe’s confrontation with Russia is deepening, but not in the way the public discourse suggests. On the ground in Ukraine, the map shifts by meters, not miles. In Western capitals, language shifts by the week. “Ceasefire,” “comprehensive deal,” “land swaps,” “war.” Meanwhile, drones define the battlefield, logistics define the risks, and rhetoric shapes domestic consent. Strip away the slogans and the picture is clearer—and more complicated—than “World War III tomorrow.”
The Front: Slow, Costly, and Drone-Saturated
Russia is grinding out very slow gains along a long, porous line. The most consequential fights cluster around Pokrovsk (Donetsk) and Kupiansk (Kharkiv), with a repelled assault reported near Sumy. Pokrovsk matters because losing it could cut a vital supply line for Ukrainian-held urban nodes in Donetsk. That’s why casual talk of trading “small bits” of Donetsk ignores their operational role in Ukraine’s defense.
Drones have changed the game. They make it hazardous to mass forces or move artillery without being seen or struck. Think of drones as cheap, ubiquitous close air support in a war where neither side has air dominance. They amplify reconnaissance and precision strike but don’t erase fundamentals: this remains an artillery-and-mines war. Ukraine is nimble and inventive; Russia scales production better. That structural imbalance matters unless Western supply chains close the gap.
Bottom line: Expect attrition and positional battles, not decisive breakthroughs—unless one side unlocks a new edge in air defense, electronic warfare, or munitions depth.
Diplomacy: From “Ceasefire Now” to “Comprehensive Deal,” Then Confusion
The latest U.S.–Russia diplomatic burst began with Washington pushing unconditional ceasefire and direct Putin–Zelensky talks—with sanctions escalation dangled if progress stalled. After the Anchorage/Alaska summit, the conversation flipped toward a Russian-preferred package: freeze lines, redraw parts of Donetsk/Luhansk, and then argue over security guarantees later. Over the following weekend, public talk from U.S. principals briefly floated Article 5–like guarantees, then walked them back.
The reported Russian version of “guarantees” implied Moscow as a guarantor with veto power—a non-starter for Kyiv and Europe. The through-line is process, not ideology: inconsistent preparation and messaging created whiplash, forcing Europeans into damage control—a recurring pattern in this phase of the war.
Bottom line: Negotiating space is narrow and requires disciplined sequencing and credible enforcement concepts. Public freelancing on “guarantees” and borders shrinks options, it doesn’t expand them.
Land Swaps: The Wrong Problem, in the Wrong Order
The land-swap meme keeps returning, even as fighting rages over the very sectors some would put on the table. Two errors drive it:
- Misdiagnosing Russia’s objective. The initial Kremlin plan wasn’t about acreage; it was about subjugating Kyiv—swift regime change, not classic occupation. Annexations came later, part opportunism, part domestic theater.
- Getting the sequence wrong. In any plausible peace path, you don’t fix borders first. You start with ceasefire + verification, force posture and real guarantees, then politics, and borders last. Trading away active defensive terrain up front undermines deterrence and Kyiv’s survival odds.
Bottom line: Borders are outputs of a working framework, not the ticket to enter talks.
NATO Airspace: Legal to Shoot, Risky to Manage
Recent weeks saw ~19 Russian drones enter Polish airspace (Poland shot down three—the first NATO shoot-down of Russian aircraft/drone since Turkey, 2015) and three Russian fighters spend about 12 minutes inside Estonia. This is testing: of air defenses, unity, and messaging discipline.
Shooting intruders down is lawful but not a free lunch. Debris lands on your own territory; errors invite escalation narratives. Calls to “shoot everything” deliver clarity but can deepen intra-alliance friction if responses diverge by capital. The incidents also signal a resource dilemma: retain air defense at home or export more to Ukraine.
Bottom line: Pre-agreed response ladders, shared public comms, and rapid forensics protocols reduce the gray-zone advantage—and alliance squabbling.
Europe’s Role: Paying the Bills, Planning the Day After
With Washington “wishing Ukraine well” but often backing away, Europe is bankrolling the fight and gaming a post-ceasefire posture: rear-area training, resupply, some air defense, away from front lines. These plans are contingent—they don’t happen until a deal stops the shooting—and they’re sensitive to U.S. participation signals that appear and then recede.
Longer-term, Europe must align spending, buying, and posture as U.S. conventional presence trends down. Any NATO–Russia war would likely be very short—either de-escalated quickly or nuclear. That reality heightens the premium on crisis stability and credible conventional denial—not on symbolic deployments.
Bottom line: Build magazines, air defenses, ISR/EW, logistics, and interoperability. Signal seriously; avoid theatrics.
Ukraine’s Politics: Civil Society Works, Elections Can Wait
Despite war fatigue, civil society is alive. When Kyiv moved to curb two anti-corruption agencies, spontaneous protests and EU backlash forced a rapid reversal. On elections: polling suggests Zelensky could win, but nationwide voting now would be a gift to Russian interference. The broad consensus inside Ukraine favors unity over timelines.
Bottom line: Condition aid on anti-corruption guardrails and civil-society capacity. Synchronize governance reforms with security realities, not the news cycle.
The Rhetoric Problem: Calling Everything “War” Isn’t Strategy
Mark Galeotti’s warning is simple and useful: both Moscow and Western leaders are weaponizing the “w-word.” For the Kremlin, “real war” talk helps socialize rising costs (VAT hikes, rationing) while periodic de-escalatory notes (Medvedev) dampen panic about catastrophic escalation. In Europe, “new type of war” talk helps mobilize support when everyday impacts remain limited for most citizens.
There is a real threat from Russian subversion, sabotage, cyber, and intel activity. But dressing today’s competition up as an existential war can corrode trust and narrow off-ramps. Many threats to democracy are, as Galeotti puts it, closer to home—governance, media hygiene, rule of law.
Bottom line: Use precise language—call it sustained hostile statecraft and multidomain coercion, not a blanket “war.” Voters deserve sober risk, cost, and objective statements—not fear-first slogans.
What To Do (If You Actually Want Results)
- Fight the war that exists.
Prioritize air defense (incl. C-UAS), 155mm/GMLRS/loitering munitions, EW, ISR, engineer breaching, mobility, and logistics nodes. Fund European industry to offset Russia’s scale advantage. - Sequence diplomacy like adults.
(1) Ceasefire + verification → (2) Force posture & credible guarantees (triggers, timelines, enforcement) → (3) Political issues → (4) Borders. Stop freelancing on guarantees in public. - Manage the alliance for the gray zone.
Pre-bake ROE ladders for incursions; standardize public communication and evidence chains. Protect home AD without starving Ukraine’s AD. - Build European muscle, not just budgets.
Convert euros to munitions, AD, ISR/EW, transport, maintenance, and training pipelines. Keep “peacekeeping” concepts in the drawer until a ceasefire exists. - Back Ukraine’s governance where it works.
Tie assistance to anti-corruption benchmarks; fund civil-society oversight. Defer national elections until interference risks are manageable. - De-escalate the vocabulary.
Retire “war” as a catch-all. Precision in language preserves policy flexibility and public trust.
Conclusion
The Euro–Russian confrontation is serious but not the interstate war some claim it to be. In Ukraine, drones and artillery define a war of inches; at negotiating tables, sequencing and credibility—not wordplay—will determine outcomes. In Europe, magazines and air defenses matter more than slogans. And on both sides of the divide, the careless use of the “w-word” is a policy liability. Clear eyes, precise terms, disciplined process: that’s how you reduce risk and increase the odds of a durable peace that doesn’t mortgage security or sovereignty.
