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Update 5

Iran appears to have reestablished regional military command and control with the first round of strikes on Tel Aviv. According to unverified reports, Iran launched around 100 ballistic missiles—fewer than in Operations True Promise 1 and 2. Israel has enacted public censorship measures to prevent the publication of images showing the extent of the damage.

Iranian air defenses are reportedly back online and operational, with most available footage showing drones being intercepted. This is based on my own amateur video analysis, not an expert. The online posts about the shooting down of an Israeli F-35 fighter jet and the capture of a female pilot are almost certainly fake—there have been no such reports by Iranian state media and the photo are from an unrelated incident.

A new wave of Iranian drones has been launched from Iraq toward Israel—more or less matching the strike package we outlined earlier this morning, though so far without involving cruise missiles.

We believe Iran has sufficient stockpiles of ballistic missiles—likely exceeding the 2,000–3,000 estimated by U.S. intelligence—and drones to sustain strike packages for several weeks. No doubt, many Israeli dual nationals are reaching for their second passports and heading straight to Ben Gurion Airport.

Meanwhile, Trump is banking on Iran’s leaders to call him and return to the negotiating table. It’s also an opportune moment for the guy north of the Korean Peninsula to make some noise.

Update 4

Our phones are blowing up like Hezbollah pagers—with inbound calls and emails. Apologies for the lack of responsiveness; things are rather busy today… but not really, if that makes sense.

Everyone knowledgeable—or worth speaking to—on Iran or Israel affairs is understandably swamped, and there’s a fair amount of information warfare in motion. That said, the vast majority of Israeli claims regarding operational successes inside Iran appear to be accurate.

Standard military doctrine calls for battle damage assessment before any follow-up action—which, from our standpoint, makes it difficult to verify outcomes in real time. At the time of writing, the official number of fatalities stands at around 70, with roughly twice as many injured—about as many killed on an average day in Gaza by the IDF, but with only a tenth of the munitions used.

To help frame the discussion: around this time yesterday, we assessed the likelihood of a U.S. attack on Iran as low. And the likelihood of Israel going it alone was about as much as replacing the Star of David on the Israeli flag with a crescent moon. Then again, all analysis assumes rational actors behaving in their best interest with complete information—something near impossible in these situations. And most conflicts involve some degree of miscalculation by one or more parties—often only recognized in hindsight.

Nevertheless, here are some background points and observations for added context:

  • Correction to a previous update: the 200 drones the IDF reported as heading toward Israel turned out to be closer to 100—and were launched from Iraq, not Iran. That explains the shorter expected flight times. So far, there have been no confirmed retaliatory strikes by Iran—official or otherwise.
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  • According to open-source reports, UK, Jordanian, and U.S. fighter jets—flying out of Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar—helped intercept the drones. Some debris reportedly landed in Jordan.
  • Despite headlines about strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, this appears more a play for regime destabilization. The targeting of senior IRGC officials and key infrastructure seems intended to provoke internal unrest. While the Iranian public is still in shock, reports of dissent are sporadic and unverified. Promoting internal conflict has long been part of Israeli grand strategy toward Iran.
  • Every accusation lobbed at one side often mirrors an equal or greater vulnerability on the other. Betting military strategy on such fault lines is inherently risky.
  • Iran’s decisions in the coming days are unlikely to be shaped by Trump’s social media antics. His flip-flopping on the U.S. posture is, if anything, less damaging than it would be under any other U.S. president.
  • Speculation about U.S. complicity or orchestration abounds, but it’s unlikely there was a master plan between Netanyahu and Trump. Trump lacks both message discipline and strategic foresight—see: tariffs.
  • While Iran is known for long-term strategic thinking, as Ali Vaez put it, when faced with a choice between losing face or the neck—they prefer the latter.
  • It’s more likely Trump ignored his own advisors by failing to restrain Israel. U.S. military assets are currently out of position to protect American interests if escalation occurs. If that happens, expect serious questions about the wisdom of risking U.S. lives on the back of a high-risk Israeli operation.
  • Iran rejected back-channel offers from Trump after his JCPOA withdrawal in 2018—we have that on good authority.
  • The recent Israeli drone strikes mirror Ukraine’s against Russian targets, further blurring attribution lines—especially with Patriot batteries recently transferred from Israel to Ukraine.
  • Iran’s military doctrine emphasizes decentralized regional command structures post-Iraq and Afghanistan. We’ll now see whether theory holds in practice.
  • The nature and timing of Iran’s response depend on how much capability Israel has truly degraded. Reports indicate widespread strikes across Iran, suggesting Israel hopes to preempt a coordinated counterattack.
  • Netanyahu and the IDF have prepped the public for a one-week campaign. The IDF is a reservist force designed for short wars. So, assuming Iran has the option, drawing the conflict out beyond two weeks may be in its strategic interest.
  • For reference: in a survey we conducted in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, over 80% of respondents expected the war to end within three days, and more than 90% expected it to be over within a month of the February 2022 invasion.


We’ll do our best to provide further updates.

Update 3

The new head of the IRGC has been announced. So far, the IDF reports that Iran has launched 200 drones toward Israel. They are expected to take around four hours to reach Israeli airspace. Ballistic missiles, when launched from Iran, take roughly 12 minutes, while cruise missiles take longer—depending on the launch point.

Based on discussions with Professor Ted Postol back in October, the strategy makes sense: saturate Israeli air defenses with ballistic missiles first this time to deplete interceptors, then follow with more accurate cruise and ballistic missiles—the opposite of OTP-1 where drones and cruise missiles were decoys for the wave of ballistic missiles.

The real question is whether Hezbollah will enter the fray with its arsenal of short-range missiles. Israel has already issued stern warnings and conducted preemptive strikes to deter them.

The strike packages are usually preplanned—this is likely to be a prolonged campaign.

Few will mourn the deaths of IRGC commanders. But the assassination of top nuclear scientists—and especially the reported killing of children—will not sit well with the masses, no matter how unpopular the regime may be.

Update 2

Iran has been “weeks or months away” from acquiring a nuclear weapon for the past 25 years. And Israel has always had “no option” but to act.

Now, it's highly likely that Iran will follow through on it's threats and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a move that would deal a serious blow to global nonproliferation efforts, both regionally and beyond. Chalk it up as one more addition to the long list of tactically smart, strategically foolish decisions.

Here's what's confirmed so far:

Military assassinations

– IRGC Chief-of-Staff Hossein Salami

– IRGC General Gholamali Rashid

Nuclear scientists

– Dr. Fereydoun Abbasi

– Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi

– Dr. Abdolhamid Minouchehr

Attacks in Tehran

– Qeitarieh, Tehran

– Niavaran, Tehran

– West Tehran and Chitgar

– East Tehran

– Mehrabad, Tehran

– Mahalati, Tehran

– Shahid Chamran, Tehran

– Tower in Kamranieh, Tehran

– Saadat Abad, Tehran

– Anderzgoo, Tehran

– Orchid Complex in Sattarkhan, Tehran

– Shahid Daghayeghi Settlement in Tehran 

– Farahzadi, Tehran

– Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters, Tehran

– Ali Shamkhani's residence

– Shahrara, Tehran

– Sadat Abad Square Teachers' Complex, Tehran Border

Other cities and locations

–  Natanz nuclear site

– Parchin nuclear facilities

– Military bases in Tehran and Qom Province

– Khorammabad

– Hamedan

– Parchin 

– Qasr Shirin

– Tabriz

– Piranshahr

– Kermanshah

– Ilam

– Arak heavy water facility

Update 1

The ongoing wave of Israeli strikes across Iran comes as a daring and highly unexpected move. The situation is far more serious than previous tit-for-tat exchanges—not least because many of the strikes targeted densely populated civilian areas around the capital, Tehran.

If even half of the emerging reports are accurate, the damage suffered by Iran is significant. It’s being reported that Mossad agents—most likely MEK members—have assassinated several senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists.

The above-ground Natanz nuclear facility near Isfahan was also reportedly hit—it will be interesting to see what the IAEA has to say. The more sensitive nuclear enrichment facilities, however, remain deep underground.

As in the October attacks of last year, Israeli Air Force (IAF) fighter jets launched air-to-surface missiles from Iraqi airspace—there are no reports of Israeli aircraft entering Iranian airspace.

With the top most senior IRGC commanders (Hossein Salami)—and at least one of his deputies—taken out, an immediate Iranian response seems unlikely.

As for how Iran may retaliate: we can expect a package of drone, cruise missile, and ballistic missile strikes launched from both Iran and Iraq. Unlike Operations True Promise (OTP) I and II, Israeli targets this time may be indiscriminate and include non-military sites.

As a reminder, in Operation True Promise II (OTP 2), Iran claimed to have launched 200 ballistic missiles at three targets inside Israel. According to U.S. CENTCOM, 181 missiles were confirmed to have exited Iranian airspace—a roughly 90% launch success rate, which is consistent with test-launch benchmarks.

The most recent OSINT analysis of Nevatim Airbase has confirmed an additional 11 missile impact points, bringing the total tally at this site alone to 47.

Contrary to mainstream reports, Iran’s ballistic missiles have proven to be blunt but effective instruments—capable of penetrating Israeli air defenses during saturation attacks. Notably, the intermediate “David’s Sling” layer of defense was largely ineffective during OTP 2.

Strap in and stay safe!

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Iran-Israel | Running Updates – Jun 13, 2025

Israel strikes across Iran